Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration

September 2022
This report was researched and compiled by Clare Carlile and Rob Harrison at Ethical Consumer between February and July 2022.

Specialists interviewed for and helping with this report include:

- Mike Ainsworth: Chairperson of the NPCC Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crime, Former chair of Independent Advisory Board on Hate Crime, Former London Director of Stop Hate UK
- Chris Allen: Associate Professor in Hate Studies at the Centre for Hate Studies at the University of Leicester’s School of Criminology
- Dr. Jenni Berlin: Partnerships and Research Manager at The Traveller Movement
- Amy Clarke: Research and Teaching Fellow in Hate Studies at the University of Leicester’s School of Criminology
- Faisal Hanif: Media Monitoring Analyst at the Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM), Author of CfMM’s report ‘British Media’s Coverage of Muslims and Islam (2018-2020)
- Bill Howe: Online Services Manager at Stop Hate UK
- Harriet Kingaby: Co-Chair of Conscious Advertising Network
- Rita Jabri Markwell: Australian Muslim Advocacy Network
- Alex Murray: Civil Society Partnerships Manager at Conscious Advertising Network
- Pia Oberoi: Senior Advisor on Migration and Human Rights for the Asia Pacific Region for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, Former head of migrant rights work at Amnesty International’s International Secretariat
- Dr. Limor Simhony Philpott: External Affairs and Policy Manager at Anti-Semitism Policy Trust
- Richard Wilson: Director at Stop Funding Hate

This report also appears online at: https://research.ethicalconsumer.org/research-hub/addressing-subtle-forms-of-anti-migrant-hate-2022

This research report was made possible thanks to the support of Paul Hamlyn Foundation.
3.2 Amends to categorisation..................................................................................................52
3.3 Possible uses of categorisation...................................................................................53
3.4 Possible limitations to categorisation...........................................................................54

4. Is it possible to communicate subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate to a wider audience?........................................................................................................54
   4.1 Feasibility of communicating more subtle forms and drivers of hate.......................54
   4.2 Techniques for communicating subtle forms and drivers of hate..............................55

5. Can the Stop Funding Hate tactics tackle more subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate?..............................................................................................................64
   5.1 Feedback on potential for Stop Funding Hate campaign............................................64
   5.2 Key necessary components for a Stop Funding Hate campaign.................................65
   5.3 Role within a larger ecosystem...................................................................................65
   5.4 Targeting allies and / or the central 'can be convinced' group....................................66

6. To what extent are marketing and advertising departments open to tackling more subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate?.........................................................................66
   6.1 'Overton Window' for conscious advertising...............................................................66
   6.2 Awareness around more subtle forms of hate............................................................68

7. What is the boundary of media responsibility when reporting on anti-migrant hate perpetuated by the government?...........................................................................................69
   7.1 Perspectives on responsibility....................................................................................69
   7.2 Value of engaging with advertisers in a hostile policy context....................................70

8. Are there other approaches that might help here too such as education or promoting discussion?.....................................................................................................................72

Bibliography.........................................................................................................................73
Executive summary

This research report was designed by Stop Funding Hate and Ethical Consumer to address the problem of subtle hate in UK media coverage of migration and to explore ways of addressing it. It sought to answer three main questions:

- What do we mean when we talk about more subtle forms of hate speech?
- How can more coded forms of anti-migrant hate be more effectively identified and tackled?
- How can societies best stand up to it and prevent it from proliferating further?

For this report we undertook a literature review and drew on key input from academics and expert practitioners.

Hate in UK media coverage on migration

Anti-migrant hate in the UK media specifically has been well documented. In 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, urged British authorities and media to take steps to curb incitement to hatred by tabloid newspapers, after decades of “sustained and unrestrained anti-foreigner abuse.”¹ The call followed publication of an article in the Sun newspaper calling migrants “cockroaches”. The UN noted: “the Sun article was simply one of the more extreme examples of thousands of anti-foreigner articles that have appeared in UK tabloids over the past two decades. Asylum seekers and migrants have been linked to rape, murder, disease, theft, and almost every conceivable crime and misdemeanor in front-page articles and two-page spreads, in cartoons, editorials, even on the sports pages of almost all the UK’s national tabloid newspapers.”²

Building on the statements, in 2016 the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance criticized UK media, particularly the UK tabloid press, over its “offensive, discriminatory and provocative terminology” including on migration.³

Moving towards more subtle forms of hate speech in UK media coverage on migration

In more recent years, however, some media outlets in the UK have taken explicit steps to address hateful reporting. Two national newspapers have publicly reviewed their policies in relation to reporting on migration.⁴ The new editor at the Daily Express publicly reformed its approach, after the paper published 70 anti-migrant front pages in 2016 and was targeted by

---


Stop Funding Hate. As a result of these changes, vitriolic and unequivocally hateful coverage on migration appears less common, and there seems to have been a significant reduction in attention on UK media from international society.

Yet, Stop Funding Hate’s consultations with partners have revealed ongoing concern about the prevalence of more subtle anti-migrant narratives within the UK media. One particular worry raised is that such narratives may, in some cases, have a greater impact on public perceptions than more obviously problematic headlines.

Many newspapers continue to publish subtle, insidious forms of hateful anti-migrant reporting. Subtle forms and drivers of hate take many forms. Media has repeatedly and disproportionately associated the migrant community with child abuse, grooming and criminality. It has published un evidence and uncontested figures on migrant numbers and repeatedly referred to new arrivals as a ‘surge’. It has obsessed over birth rates, dangerously echoing conspiracy theories that the white British population is about to be usurped.

The issue of anti-migrant sentiment clearly has not gone away. In 2020, Clarke wrote: “official and media discourse has fed into wide-spread, normalised anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment amongst the general public.” Where research has looked at ongoing media bias, it has continued to identify instances of anti-migrant rhetoric. For example, the

---

[4] How to Challenge Media Hate, Ethical Consumer, (21st November 2021). Accessed 8th March 2022. In recent years, several UK newspapers have publicly claimed to have cleaned up their act when it comes to coverage of migration. Articles referring to refugees as “cockroaches” and suggesting they should be met with gunboats in mainstream media appear to be a thing of the past. Two national newspapers have publicly reviewed their policies in relation to reporting on migration. The new editor at the Daily Express publicly reformed its approach, [https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalcampaigns/stop-funding-hate](https://www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalcampaigns/stop-funding-hate).


Centre for Media Monitoring has identified several articles from 2018-2020 where anti-migrant reporting intersects with Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{11}

For this report, Ethical Consumer interviewed ten experts on hate and migration. Across the board, interviewees expressed serious concerns about the proliferation and impact of more subtle forms of anti-migrant hate in UK media. Interviewees stated that it had a serious cumulative impact on both readers and migrants over time. As interviewees suggested, anti-migrant narratives can give “permission” for readers to hold or act on prejudice or more vitriolic hateful views. Media narratives can therefore sanction hate in wider society. Yet, such subtle forms and drivers of hate may be “normalised and embedded” in our society, often making them more difficult to recognise and identify.

Indeed, recognition of anti-migrant hate is globally several steps behind understanding of other areas. The treatment of undocumented migrants exists as a “blind spot” and the “last frontier” for tackling hate in our societies, according to Pia Oberoi, Senior Advisor on Migration and Human Rights for the Asia Pacific Region for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights.

**Dangerous cumulative impacts - or why it matters**

Anti-migrant hate impacts many in our society. It affects those who are newly arrived or undocumented, as asylum seekers and migrants, but it also impacts those who are perceived or racialised as migrants regardless of migration status. Muslim, Irish Traveller, Eastern European and other communities have been persistent targets of anti-migrant hate – both subtle and vitriolic. Understanding the intersection between anti-migrant and other forms of prejudice is therefore crucial for combatting its effects.

In recent years, the harms associated with ‘everyday hate’ and ‘microaggressions’ have been widely evidenced. Victims of these kinds of hate are more likely to experience depression and the exacerbation of existing trauma. They are more likely to withdraw from everyday life, avoid certain public spaces and / or feel forced to conceal their nationality or asylum seeker status.

While limited research has specifically studied the impacts of subtle hate in the media, much is known about the symbiotic relationship between media narratives, public prejudice and harmful policy stances. As interviewees suggested, anti-migrant narratives can give “permission” for readers to hold or act on prejudice or more vitriolic hateful views. Media narratives sanction hate in wider society.

It is also clear that the hate speech against refugees and migrants can manifest itself in serious acts of violence. This can be about people fearing for their own safety and not just about being made to feel unwelcome. Indeed, in the main report, we explore a couple of academic works, such as Allport's Scale of Prejudice, which situates subtle forms of hate

speech at the beginning of an erosion of values that can end in serious violence and even genocide\textsuperscript{12}.

**What is subtle hate?**

Subtle hate refers to coded or implied “hostile, derogatory or negative… slights and insults”\textsuperscript{13} against migrant individuals or groups. It is usually characterised by content that constructs migrants as a threat / problem / unwelcome / to be scared of, without stating it in explicit terms. Drivers of hate spread, encourage, or sanction such views in wider society.

Both subtle forms and drivers of hate can manifest in multiple ways. Due to their covert and nuanced nature, subtle forms and drivers of hate can be difficult to identify as isolated articles or headlines. They are instead characterised by repetition, sheer volume, or disproportionality of focus on an issue.

According to interviewees, for example, the UK media repeatedly makes unevidenced links between migration and overwhelmed public services. It makes frequent generalisations about Muslim migrants oppressing women in their communities. It disproportionately shows Black male migrants waiting in queues, jumping out of lorries or climbing over fences. While individual instances of these kinds of reporting may appear neutral, “a sustained approach has a very different impact” and can clearly produce an anti-migrant narrative over time.

**Examples and categorisations of subtle form of hate**

As part of the research we undertook a literature review and also tried to collect together all the examples we could find of subtle hate. There is a 62 page Appendix to the main report which lists examples and also looks at whether they fall into categories which help us to understand them. Working through this list and talking to specialists in this space led us to identify six key components of hateful reporting, beyond explicit vitriolic hate.

Categorising subtle forms and drivers of hate is crucial for building public understanding. As one interviewee pointed out: “If people don’t have words for it, it’s not a thing. Giving a narrative casing for subtle forms of hate is unbelievably helpful.” (Harriet Kingaby, Conscious Advertising Network).

The table on the next page describes each category and summarises some of the examples and tropes that might be found under each one. Just one newspaper article could fall under multiple categories. The main report proposes how the categories could be developed further and used for monitoring, education and building evidence of sustained anti-migrant reporting.

\textsuperscript{12} See section 3.4 in the main report.

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overarching category</th>
<th>Subcategories</th>
<th>Examples of speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vitriolic hate</strong></td>
<td>Epithets</td>
<td>Dirty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit forms of hate, including incitement (This is unlikely to be subtle)</td>
<td>Incitement to violence</td>
<td>Cheating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incitement to discrimination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘Threat’ construction</strong></td>
<td>Demonisation</td>
<td>Bogus claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The portrayal of migrants as a threat, and the construction of an ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’</td>
<td>“Accusations in a mirror”</td>
<td>Scroungers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of ‘symbolic threat’</td>
<td>Links to terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of ‘realistic threat’</td>
<td>Criminals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of in-groups and out-groups</td>
<td>‘Islamic Europe’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assumption of incompatibility</td>
<td>Cultural threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral panic</td>
<td>‘Cricket test’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portrayal of migration in terminology of war</td>
<td>Negative assumptions of economic impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conspiracy theory</td>
<td>Incompatibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misogyny in reporting</td>
<td>Violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Misogyny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Great Replacement Conspiracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on ‘birth rates’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Refusal to assimilate’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Threat to white women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Generalisations about oppression of women from migrant group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevant emphasis on nationality in reports on sexual assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>References to ‘lefty lawyers’ undermining democracy and / or British values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Association with FGM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘Queue jumping’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bringing disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fakes, inaccuracy and misrepresentation</strong></td>
<td>Toxic misinformation</td>
<td>Links to terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of inaccurate and / or unevideenced claims</td>
<td>Assumptions of harm</td>
<td>Threats to law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unevideenced claims</td>
<td>Bogus claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distortion of facts</td>
<td>Criminals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>Illegal migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misuse of terms / miscategorisation</td>
<td>Negative assumptions of economic impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure to distinguish between comment, conjecture and fact</td>
<td>Unevidenced links between migration and overstretched public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misrepresentation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scapegoating</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective reporting</strong></td>
<td>Selective reporting</td>
<td>No migrant voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omitting certain issues around migration or giving disproportionate prominence to other issues</td>
<td>Lack of due prominence</td>
<td>No migration histories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No Muslim voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No coverage of women migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Imagery that solely focuses on male migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Selective quoting of third-party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generalisations</th>
<th>Generalisation</th>
<th>Stereotyping</th>
<th>Around Muslim belief/behaviour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Making a general assumption across a group based on inferences of individual cases.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard-line beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poor animal welfare tropes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>Dehumanisation</td>
<td>Massification</td>
<td>Mass migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depriving of human qualities.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Demonisation of humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Surge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Swarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intersectional prejudice</td>
<td>Prejudicial hierarchies</td>
<td>Flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Borrowing’ from other forms of prejudice to create a prejudicial view of migrants. Toxic amplification of multiple forms of hate and discrimination.</td>
<td>Intersectional prejudice</td>
<td>Construction of ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ (regardless of migration status)</td>
<td>Good migrants (e.g. NHS/white) and bad migrants (criminal, Black) Muslim plot theories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**How can societies best stand up to it and prevent it from proliferating further?**

All interviewees were asked about the feasibility of and techniques for communicating more subtle forms and drivers of hate to the UK public. This topic was discussed in depth with those from the Anti-Semitism Policy Trust, Stop Hate UK and the Conscious Advertising Network, to learn from their experiences explaining anti-Semitism, conducting counter narrative work, and challenging both hate and climate misinformation respectively. Overall, interviewees expressed mixed opinions on the feasibility of communicating subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate. While some expressed confidence that it could be done, others suggested that it was “very difficult”. “Nuance and subtlety is lost in the public, political, media spaces… it’s a massive challenge trying to talk to people about these subtle ways.” (Chris Allen)

In total, we collected together ten key approaches that interviewees thought were important. Each of these elements is discussed in a separate section in the main report.

1. Focus on trends, patterns and volume of subtle hate and drivers of hate
2. Demonstrate the impact of subtle hate – focus on harms
3. Include personal stories and migrant voices
4. Draw on understandings of other forms of prejudice
5. Ensure that you do not demonise those holding prejudicial views
6. Use and compare examples to explain what does and doesn’t constitute hate
7. Explain the origins and history of tropes
8. Support the public to anticipate tropes likely to appear in the media
9. Build wider media literacy
10. Focus on national and international standards, and demonstrate that these have not been met by media outlets in the UK
Most interviewees referenced a range of the above approaches rather than suggesting one particular tactic, and Harriet Kingaby and Alex Murray specifically stated “telling the story has lots of components”. They suggested that persuading advertisers required combining, for example, statistics from think tanks, real life stories of impacts and incidents that have got that particular corporation to the table.

**The role of civil society**

Clearly, subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate in UK media need addressing, but these forms necessarily fall outside of content regulation and legislation. Civil society therefore holds a crucial role in addressing this area and for communicating more subtle forms and drivers of hate to the UK public.

**The case for intervention**

Stop Funding Hate is well placed to campaign for change. Interviewees referenced the previous successes of the campaign; the significance of its tactics to economically incentivise change; the importance of its commercial angle in the context of an “unfit for purpose complaints body”; and the way in which Stop Funding Hate was able to make a material argument that cut through toxic debates around ‘political correctness’ and ‘woke wars’.

Many interviewees also referenced the particular difficulties of launching a campaign of this kind at this time – from the hostile political environment around migration to the toxic social media backlash against ‘snowflakes’ and ‘culture wars’. However, even where interviewees expressed concerns or emphasised the challenges of this kind of campaign, they suggested that “it’s absolutely the right place for Stop Funding Hate to be.”

Interviewees identified crucial components for a campaign of this kind, each of which is explored in more detail in the main report. Key components are summarised below:

- Public support behind the campaign
- Evidence of a pattern or trend
- Evidence of the cumulative effect of more subtle forms of hate

**Ensuring public support**

For the public to support a campaign of this kind, it needs to understand what subtle hate is and what it looks like, as well as its impact and trends. This report highlights key techniques that could be used to build media literacy around subtle hate. Approaches include comparing hateful and legitimate examples of migration reporting, explaining the history of particular tropes and stereotypes, educating about how discourse can dehumanize a group identity over time and providing facts and figures on the prevalence of subtle prejudiced views in society as a whole.
Evidencing a pattern or trend

Interviewees repeatedly emphasised the importance of demonstrating a “sustained approach” by media outlets over time. Building this body of evidence was highlighted as crucial to both ensuring public support and persuading advertisers. Interviewees mentioned a variety of approaches to demonstrating trends, patterns and volume. Several interviewees discussed more formal approaches such as concerted monitoring and civil society reporting, while others suggested more informal techniques such as using images to demonstrate repetition.

Evidencing the cumulative effect

Evidencing the cumulative effect of subtle media hate was also highlighted as crucial to gaining public support and convincing advertisers. As discussed in the report, a growing body of evidence shows the serious impacts of subtle hate on victims over time, but little research has yet focused on the specific effects of media outlets. Equally important is supporting members of the migrant community to tell their personal stories. This approach – providing an emotional appeal to action – draws on findings from the counter-narrative movement that stories rather than facts can change public views. It also supports the necessary work of rehumanising migrants, who have been consistently dehumanised by the press.

The responsibility of media and advertisers

The responsibility of media in tackling both hate and bias has been recognised internationally, and the UN and other intergovernmental or civil society organisations have provided guidance on best practice for migration reporting.

More recently, international and national guidelines – from The UN Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration[14] to the UK Government Online Advertising Programme’s Taxonomy of Industry Harms[15] – have also recognised the role of advertisers. As the UN Compact says, “in full respect for the freedom of the media, advertisers should avoid providing funds “to media outlets that systematically promote intolerance, xenophobia, racism and other forms of discrimination towards migrants.”[16] Subtle hate is a crucial element of systematic and sustained promotion of intolerance by media outlets.

In recent years, a growing number of advertisers in the UK have also recognised the brand risks associated with, and their responsibility to avoid, funding hateful reporting. Advertisers have withdrawn funding from a number of media outlets and made long-term commitments

---


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
to better practice through membership of the Conscious Advertising Network. Yet, subtle forms and drivers of hate have remained largely unaddressed.

**Part of an ecosystem for change**

Whilst it’s impossible to conclusively say whether campaigning on subtle forms of hate would directly succeed in persuading advertisers to withdraw funding from subtle hate and drivers of hate, the report concludes that a Stop Funding Hate campaign on subtle forms of hate could play a significant role as part of a wider “ecosystem” of different civil society interventions. Useful additional work in this area would include:

- Providing a framework within which to understand more subtle forms of hate;
- Helping to provide tools and industry standards (such as a measurement framework to reliably assess subtle hate);
- Reframe the conversation to include subtle hate campaigns rather than just individual articles and posts;
- Ensure that advertisers have to “get around the table” on the issue of more subtle forms of hate and push for solutions through coalitions like the Conscious Advertising Network.
Part A: Literature review

1. Definition of terms

1.1 Hate and hate speech

1.1.1 Legal definitions of hate speech

The definition of hate speech “is often contested.”

[It is “a broad term used to describe speech which attacks others on the grounds of their race, nationality, religious identity, gender, sexual orientation or other group membership, where this group membership is a morally arbitrary distinguishing feature.”]

While the term “hate speech” is relatively modern, the concept extends at least to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), after the second world war. Article 7 of the UDHR proclaims that: “All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination” [italics added]. While it does not reference hate speech directly, it clearly lays the ground for legislation against hate speech where incitement is involved.

The UDHR was a decisive framework, but was non-binding. Since then, binding documents have provided legal frameworks for the concept of hate speech, including:

- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral treaty that was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966. Article 20 prohibits advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, but does not mention the term “hate speech”.
- The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Injustice is the UN monitoring body for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was established in 1969. It states that “it is incumbent upon the State to

---

17 Gagliardone, Iginio; Gal, Danit; Alves, Thiago; and Martinez, Gabriela, ‘Countering Online Hate Speech’ from Unesco Series on Internet Freedom, Unesco. [http://egalitecontreracisme.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/countering_online_hate_speech_3.pdf](http://egalitecontreracisme.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/countering_online_hate_speech_3.pdf)
21 Gagliardone, Iginio; Gal, Danit; Alves, Thiago; and Martinez, Gabriela, ‘Countering Online Hate Speech’ from Unesco Series on Internet Freedom, Unesco. [http://egalitecontreracisme.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/countering_online_hate_speech_3.pdf](http://egalitecontreracisme.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/countering_online_hate_speech_3.pdf)

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
investigate with due diligence and expedition" every threat of racial violence, 
"especially when they are made in public and by a group." It therefore places a duty 
on states to condemn in law both propaganda and organisations "based on ideas or 
theories" of racial superiority, hatred and discrimination, whether they are private or 
public.

These two frameworks show the variety of even legal definitions of hate speech.

Indeed, these international agreements are inconsistently enacted in national legislation. The 
UN’s Rabat Plan of Action, launched by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in 2013, "acknowledges that, despite the obligations for states that are ICCPR 
signatories, many legal frameworks do not contain legal prohibition of such advocacy or that 
some laws that do so also use terminology that is inconsistent with Article 20 of the 
ICCPR." 

Nazila Ghanea’s table below nonetheless gives a helpful overview of international legislation 
and the variety of frameworks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discriminatory speech</th>
<th>Hate speech</th>
<th>Incitement to hatred</th>
<th>Incitement to terrorism</th>
<th>Incitement to genocide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(e.g. see CERD General Recommendation 29)</td>
<td>(e.g. see Article 20, ICCPR)</td>
<td>(e.g. see “incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts” in Article 1(1) of Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005))</td>
<td>(e.g. see “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” in Article 3(c) of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Ghanea’s table shows, there is a spectrum of severity in what may be considered hateful, 
with some forms of speech coming under international and national laws and some 
remaining outside of legislation.

---


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
1.1.2 Hate speech and freedom of speech

Amongst civil society, academic and legal experts, there is consensus that concerns about ‘hate speech’ must be balanced alongside concerns about ‘freedom of speech’ and expression.

While freedom of expression is recognised under international law, it is not an absolute right, and has prohibitions and limitations attached. The UDHR states that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes “freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”27 Taken alongside article 7 prohibiting incitement to discrimination, it can be understood that “everyone has the right to be protected against hate speech insofar as such speech incorporates discriminatory objectives.”28

The ICCPR likewise emphasises the right to freedom of expression, alongside the condemnation of hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.29 The balance of these two concerns within the framework shows that restrictions must be imposed on freedom of expression when it involves public incitement.

These frameworks suggest that the legal threshold for defining ‘hate speech’ is a necessarily high one. As Article 19, an NGO focusing on freedom of speech, states: “too readily identifying expression as ‘hate speech’ should also be avoided, as its use can also have negative consequences. The term is highly emotive, and can be abused to justify inappropriate restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, in particular in cases of marginalised and vulnerable groups.”30

Limitations to freedom of speech as a human right can, and have been, abused by governments around the world. As such, the UN recognises that limitations “must constitute an exception to the rule and must be kept to the minimum necessary to pursue the legitimate aim of safeguarding other human rights established in the Covenant.”31 The default must be freedom of expression, to which exceptional limitations can apply, and these limitations must involve the minimum steps possible for ensuring other human rights.

Recognised as the rules of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportion’, these principles can be seen in practice throughout much international legislation. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights states that freedom of expression “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for

the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

Article 19 have published a useful graphic to explain the gradation in hate in the context of freedom of expression:

![The 'Hate Speech Pyramid']

What the pyramid shows is that while the legal bar for ‘hate speech’ definitions remains necessarily high, there are many hateful forms of speech that cannot be legislated again but should “raise concerns in terms of intolerance”.

This distinction has been reiterated for example in the UN’s Rabat Plan of Action, which states: “it is essential to make a careful distinction between (a) forms of expression that should constitute a criminal offence; (b) forms of expression that are not criminally punishable, but may justify a civil suit; and (c) forms of expression that do not give rise to criminal or civil sanctions, but still raise concerns in terms of tolerance, civility and respect for the convictions of others.”

---

The complexity of enacting these varied definitions in practice is clear. As the UNESCO series on Internet Freedom comments, "there is a grey area in conceptualising clear distinctions between (i) expressions of hatred, (ii) expressions that advocate hatred, and (iii) hateful speech that specifically constitutes incitement to the practical harms of discrimination, hostility or violence. Thus, while states have an obligation to prohibit speech conceived as "advocacy to hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence", as consistent with Article 20 (2), how to interpret such is not clearly defined."\textsuperscript{35}

Respecting this sliding scale of hate speech, it is possible to limit civil remedies to the more severe end of spectrum (vilification as per Article 20(2)) and to invoke design standards or industry standards as levers to engender media accountability on a broader range of hate. This would go a long way to satisfy the UK's obligations under international human rights law in terms of protecting freedom of expression.

Like the Rabat Plan, those standards could accommodate context: the speaker's power, their intent, the content, and form, spread, and likelihood and imminence of harm. For this reason, it is vital that targeted communities are consulted on their contexts as otherwise decision-makers will fail to make fully competent judgements.

This area will remain rightly contested, with the legal boundaries around the concept of hate speech tested and challenged.\textsuperscript{36} However, these definitions show that attention must also be paid to speech that falls outside of legal parameters.

It is important though, that the primary question and source of legitimate concern around freedom of expression in the debate on hate speech is limited to when and how the government gets involved and legal restrictions come into play. A narrative that frames any criticism of or challenge to hate speech as an abuse of freedom of expression is clearly unhelpful.

1.1.3 Lawful hate and hateful speech

Following on from Ghanea, then, "our concern is with speech that is aimed at the victim(s) and which has not had the effect of inspiring its audience to harm the victim(s) concerned."\textsuperscript{37} Writers have offered up many possible definitions of such hateful speech that falls outside of the IPPCR's 'hate speech' definition.

David Brink says: "There is much speech that is discriminatory but does not count as hate speech. It reflects and encourages bias and harmful stereotyping, but it does not employ epithets in order to stigmatize and insult . . . vilify and wound. . . . [H]ate speech is worse than

\textsuperscript{35} Gagliardione, Iginio; Gal, Danit; Alves, Thiago; and Martinez, Gabriela, 'Countering Online Hate Speech' from Unesco Series on Internet Freedom, Unesco.

\textsuperscript{36} For example, Australian vilification laws tend to be concerned with the effect and therefore can capture subtle hate published in a serial manner by an actor if reactions of hatred can be demonstrated in the comment threads: Australian Muslim Advocacy Network & Islamic Council of Queensland v Anning [2021] QCAT 452 (17 September 2021)

discriminatory speech . . . hate speech's use of traditional epithets or symbols of derision to vilify on the basis of group membership expresses contempt for its targets and seems more likely to cause emotional distress and to provoke visceral, rather than articulate, response."38

Ghanea says:

an expression that can be considered hateful (be it conveyed through text, images or sound) sends two types of messages. The first is to the targeted group and functions to dehumanize and diminish members assigned to this group. It often sounds more or less like: “Don’t be fooled into thinking you are welcome here. [...] You are not wanted, and you and your families will be shunned, excluded, beaten, and driven out, whenever we can get away with it. We may have to keep a low profile right now. But don’t get too comfortable. [...] Be afraid.”

Another function of hate speech is to let others with similar views know they are not alone, to reinforce a sense of an in-group that is (purportedly) under threat. A typical message sent this time to like-minded individuals can read like: “We know some of you agree that these people are not wanted here. We know that some of you feel that they are dirty (or dangerous or criminal or terrorist). Know now that you are not alone. [...] There are enough of us around to make sure these people are not welcome. There are enough of us around to draw attention to what these people are really like”39

Stop Funding Hate has defined the term in more practical terms, by outlining categories under which such rhetoric may fall:

- **Demonisation**: Presenting the target group (often but not always a minority) in overwhelmingly negative terms – characterising them as inherently malicious, dishonest or threatening.
- **Toxic misinformation**: False stories linking the target group to violent, criminal or morally corrupt behaviour.
- **Dehumanisation**: Portraying the target group as subhuman – likening them to vermin, parasites or disease40, or suggesting they lack the faculty for independent thought, will or human warmth41 (acting en masse).
- **“Accusation in a mirror”**: Claiming that the target group is conspiring to attack the wider population, and poses an existential threat.
- **Incitement to violence or discrimination**.42

In this context it is also worth noting that the UN, in one of its genocide prevention documents, states:

42 ‘What is hate speech, why does it matter and how can we tackle it?’, *Stop Funding Hate*. Accessed 8th March 2022, https://stopfundinghate.info/about-the-campaign/what-is-hate-speech/
Rather than prohibiting hate speech as such, international law prohibits the incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence (referred to here as ‘incitement’). Incitement is a very dangerous form of speech, because it explicitly and deliberately aims at triggering discrimination, hostility and violence, which may also lead to or include terrorism or atrocity crimes. Hate speech that does not reach the threshold of incitement is not something that international law requires States to prohibit. It is important to underline that even when not prohibited, hate speech may to [sic] be harmful.43

1.2 ‘Subtle hate’ and ‘drivers of hate’

1.2.1 ‘Microaggressions’ and ‘everyday hate’

Having established that there is a broad spectrum of hateful expressions, it is also useful to clarify our understanding of the terms ‘subtle hate’ and ‘drivers of hate’.

Multiple scholars have argued in the last few decades that “overt prejudicial bias has been transformed into subtle and increasingly covert expressions.”44 D. W. Sue has argued that as more overt expressions of racism have become increasingly unacceptable in the mainstream, these more covert and subtle forms have emerged as the new norm.

Following this line of thought, several recent studies have considered the concept and impact of “micro”45 or “everyday”46 aggressions. While many of these studies are not specifically focused on anti-migrant hate, they can be useful in their attempts to define these concepts and due to the intersectionality of anti-migrant hate with other forms of prejudice, such as racism.

Sue defines ‘microaggressions’ as: “the more subtle forms of bias and discrimination… the brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioural, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual orientation, and religious slights and insults to the target person or group.”47 She provides a range of examples:


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
During the 2008 presidential campaign, for example, Republican Senator John McCain appeared at a political rally taking questions from his supporters. One elderly White woman, speaking into a handheld microphone, haltingly stated, “I don’t trust Obama. He’s an Arab.”

McCain shook his head, quickly took the microphone, and said, “No ma’am. He’s a decent family man, a citizen that I just happen to have disagreements with. He’s not!”  

Sue explains that, despite McCain’s responses appearing “admirable” at first glance, it contained hidden microaggressions in implicitly condoning the notion that being an Arab was untrustworthy and in contrast to the American “citizen” and “decent family man”. Other examples include telling Black students to “calm down” or implying that they are “too emotional”. Many of the incidents included demonstrate how “well-intentioned” comments or actions can contain discriminatory or biased undertones, that are often only explicit to those who they target and who are subject to such patterns of discrimination. Sue concludes, “It is the unconscious and unintentional forms of bias that create the overwhelming problems for marginalized groups in our society.”

Likewise, Hardy and Chakraborti have focused on “everyday expressions of hostility”, as experiences that “are rarely ‘one-off’ incidents and instead form part of a broader continuum of prejudice which is encountered by minority groups on a day-to-day basis.”

1.2.2 ‘Subtle hate’ - contested definitions

In exploring the use of ‘subtle hate’ in UK media coverage on migration, then, we borrow from these concepts of the ‘everyday’ and ‘microaggressions’, defining subtle hate as expressions that may be less covert and more commonplace and insidious; “hostile, derogatory, or negative” coverage of migrants in the media.

We do not use the term ‘subtle hate’ to suggest that such expressions are necessarily less harmful. As Torino writes, “for targets, microaggressions are often continual, never-ending, and cumulative in nature.” Hardy and Chakraborti, as well as Clarke, have emphasised that everyday microaggressions can have significant impacts on individuals and their communities (see section X).

However, we recognise that the term ‘subtle hate’ - like “hostile, derogatory, or negative” is highly subjective, and that its application will depend on lived experience and political

---

51 edited by Torino, Gina C; Rivera, David P; Capodilupo, Christina M; Nadal, Kevin L; and Sue, Derald Wing, *Microaggression Theory: Influence and Implications*, First edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2019.
orientation as well as a range of other factors. Indeed, recent focus on concepts like ‘dog-whistles’ (‘a phrase that may sound innocuous to some people, but which also communicates something more insidious either to a subset of the audience or outside of the audience’s conscious awareness’\textsuperscript{53}) show that what may appear - and in fact be - hateful to one group might be entirely “innocuous” to another.

The Dangerous Speech Project raises a number of questions in relation to the concept of ‘hate speech’, and such questions only proliferate when focusing on more nuanced or hidden expressions.

For instance, what is hatred? How strong or how durable must emotion be to count as hatred? Another unresolved question is this: does the ‘hate’ in hate speech mean that the person speaking feels hate, or wants to convince someone else to hate, or wants to make someone feel hated in response to the speech?\textsuperscript{54}

Some have argued on this basis that the terms ‘hate speech’ or ‘hate’ are therefore problematic and should be avoided.\textsuperscript{55} Rather than rejecting the term ‘hate’ altogether, this research will instead try to acknowledge these debates when looking to categorise what we mean by ‘subtle hate’, and will continue to question when and whether it’s useful to name it in this way. The entire spectrum of hateful expression “touches on contested issues of dignity, free expression, liberty and democracy,”\textsuperscript{56} which need to be considered and balanced in research.

Other researchers have argued that dehumanisation is a more widely acceptable harm to be avoided, because its appearance can be more defined than hate, and operates at both a speech and discursive level (through conceptions, narratives and tropes).\textsuperscript{57}

We will also consider the concept of ‘drivers of hate’ - expressions that cannot be considered ‘hateful’ in their own right, or that would be highly controversial or unhelpful to do so - but that breed a culture of hate and intolerance in the real world.

\textsuperscript{53} Olasov, Ian, ‘Offensive political dog whistles: you know them when you hear them. Or do you?’, (7th November 2016), Vice. \url{www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/11/7/13549154/dog-whistles-campaign-racism}

\textsuperscript{54} Dangerous Speech Project, FAQs. Accessed 7th March 2022. \url{dangerousspeech.org/faq/?faq=201}


\textsuperscript{56} Gagliardione, Iginio; Gal, Danit; Alves, Thiago; and Martinez, Gabriela, ‘Countering Online Hate Speech’ from Unesco Series on Internet Freedom, Unesco. \url{http://egalitecontreracisme.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/countering_online_hate_speech_3.pdf}

\textsuperscript{57} Abdalla, Ally and Jabri Markwell, above n 9;

1.3 Anti-migrant
1.3.1 ‘Migrant’, ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’

Civil society has emphasised the importance of using the “right language” when reporting on migration.\(^5^8\)

In UK and international law, ‘refugee’ and ‘asylum seeker’ have distinct definitions. ‘Refugee’ is defined under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as a person who:

“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”\(^5^9\)

‘Asylum seeker’ is defined by the Refugee Council as “a person who has left their country of origin and formally applied for asylum in another country but whose application has not yet been concluded.”\(^6^0\) In UK law, a person ceases to be an ‘asylum seeker’ and becomes a ‘refugee’ when the government agrees that they meet the definition of the Refugee Convention and are granted refugee status documentation.\(^6^1\)

The terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘migrant’ by contrast do not have legal definitions. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines ‘migrant’ as: “reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons... Two approaches are generally adopted to define the term ‘migrant’: the inclusivist approach, followed among others by IOM, considers the term ‘migrant’ as an umbrella term covering all forms of movements; the residualist approach excludes from the term ‘migrant’ those who flee wars or persecution.”\(^6^2\)

As the IOM’s definition suggests, definitions become more complex when considering use of the word ‘migrant’, particularly in “lay understanding”. Amy Clarke writes:

> These terms are so frequently used in official and media discourses that they have become embedded in our everyday language, yet most are unclear about who we

---


\(^6^2\) ‘Key Migration Terms’, International Organisation for Migration - UN. Accessed 8th March 2022. [https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms](https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms)
actually mean when we describe groups in this way. Oftentimes, these terms are used interchangeably with little consensus about who they include and, when used so loosely, they tend to “conflate issues of immigration status, race, ethnicity and asylum”.  

1.3.2 Politics and power in defining ‘migrant’

The lack of consensus around these terms has significant bearing when defining ‘anti-migrant’.

“Politics and power relations” underpin the process of deciding the boundaries around these categories and how those crossing borders should be considered within them. In 2015, media outlets around the world printed photos of those arriving on the shores of Greece having crossed the Mediterranean. The vast majority of those making the crossing were from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, countries known for escalating conflict and political unrest, suggesting that they would be recognised as refugees. Yet, several European leaders dismissed them as “economic migrants” taking advantage of the conflicts, complicating their asylum claims.

In a similar incident, in 2021, the UK government stated that the majority of those crossing the channel on small boats were “economic migrants” rather than asylum seekers, while justifying push backs on those crossing the channel, despite evidence to the contrary. These politicians emphasised categorical distinctions at the same time as they sought to challenge and redefine common-sense understandings of who could be considered a refugee and expand the meaning of ‘economic migrant.’

Such redrawing of lines has likewise been seen in the UK media. In 2016, the Daily Mail published the headline: “The tragic but brutal truth: They are not REAL refugees! Despite drowning tragedy thousands of economic migrants are still trying to reach Europe.” The article went on to argue, “the explosion in migration is completely out of control.” As Anderson and Bliner write, “Media discourses commonly use such terms [migrant and asylum seeker] interchangeably, particularly in tabloid newspaper discussions of asylum. When asylum applications in European countries increased sharply in 2015 and 2016, media

---


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
coverage often used the term ‘migrants’ pejoratively to refer to economic migrants in contrast to ‘genuine refugees’. “68

In each instance, politicians and media clearly tapped into ‘anti-migrant’ sentiment. Therefore, it is useful to take the “inclusivist approach” in defining ‘migrant’, using it as “an umbrella term covering all forms of movement.” In doing so, we recognise that its meaning is continually shifting and that anti-migrant sentiment targets a broad range of people.69

In the last decades, changes to the UK’s “Hostile Environment” policy have also subtly shifted the boundaries around ‘migrant’ in relation to residency in the UK and citizenship status. In December 2021, New Statesman reported: “Two in five people in England and Wales from an ethnic minority background could become eligible to be deprived of their citizen status without warning.” The article explained that since 2006, the Home Secretary has had the power to strip dual nationals of their British citizenship if deemed to be “conducive to the public good”; and that since 2014, these powers have been extended to “foreign-born British citizens without dual nationality… if the government believes they are eligible for foreign citizenship.” In 2019, in the well-documented case of the former Islamic State supporter, Shamima Begum was stripped of citizenship despite being born in the UK and not possessing a foreign passport because she was considered a Bangladeshi citizen under Bangladesh’s law until the age of 21.70

The UK government has gradually expanded its powers of deportation, and in doing so subtly (and concerningly) expanded the concept of ‘migrant’. Begum was granted UK-citizenship at birth on the basis of her parent’s immigration status: she has now been stripped of it on the same basis.71 These powers therefore beg the questions: how long are individuals considered migrants for? Is an individual a migrant only at the point of arrival or 10, 15, 20, or 50 years into residency in the country? Can a UK-born citizen also be a migrant?

Therefore, while this research will seek to use precise definitions when referring to the status of individual persons, it will take a broad definition of ‘anti-migrant’. In doing so, we seek to recognise that those who would not identify themselves as migrants may still experience anti-migrant hate; that the definition of ‘migrant’ implied by anti-migrant rhetoric will change over time; and that the definition of ‘migrant’ indeed has and may be actively altered or expanded to serve anti-migrant or xenophobic purposes.

There is, however, one important caveat to our understanding of ‘anti-migrant hate’. We can return to Sorial’s definition of hate as “speech which attacks others on the grounds of their race, nationality, religious identity, gender, sexual orientation or other group membership, where this group membership is a morally arbitrary distinguishing feature.” Sorial’s definition makes clear that for rhetoric to be classified as ‘anti-migrant hate’ it must focus on attacks against migrants as individuals or a collective - as distinct from discussions around the political issue of migration.

1.3.3 Intersections with race and ethnicity

‘Anti-migrant hate’ clearly intersects with other forms of prejudice. Anderson and Binder state that the term migrant is often used to “conflate issues of immigration status, race, ethnicity and asylum”. This research will therefore seek to take an intersectional approach, recognising “the structural and dynamic consequences of the interaction between two or more forms of discrimination or systems of subordination.”

One example of this in practice was the 2015 Conservative Home Office campaign “on ‘illegal’ migrants with the divisive slogan ‘Go Home or face arrest’. (The slogan ‘Go Home’ featured prominently in the racist and fascist National Front graffiti of the 1970s.) Yasmin Alibhai-Brown wrote of the campaign, “The messages subliminally warned all people of colour not to get too comfortable, to assume we were safe. We who came to stay jumped through hoops of fire to get acceptance. But now we know it can be withdrawn… The Tories always use the race card. They don’t even pretend inclusion any more.”

While race and ethnicity are therefore important aspects, we do not define the term ‘anti-migrant hate’ in relation to any specific ethnicity, country of origin, or race. For example, Rzepnikowska, Lumsden et al., and others have discussed anti-migrant media coverage of white populations including Polish people and Gypsies and Travellers. The concept of ‘undesirable whiteness’ shows that ethnicity is not the only predeterminate for who will be targeted.

---

‘othered’ in the media. Indeed, Lumsden et al. suggest that portrayals of Eastern European migrants have borrowed from racist understandings of migration to transfer culturally accrued stigma from one group to another. Their work shows that we may take an intersectional approach, while maintaining a broad understanding of who may be targeted by anti-migrant coverage in the media.

2. Literature on hate in UK media coverage on migration

In 2021, Conzo, Pierluigi et al. wrote, "Anti-immigration rhetoric in the mass media has intensified over the last two decades." Anti-migrant hate in the UK media specifically has been well documented. In 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, urged British authorities and media to take steps to curb incitement to hatred by tabloid newspapers, after decades of "sustained and unrestrained anti-foreigner abuse."

The call followed publication of an article in the Sun newspaper calling migrants “cockroaches”. The UN noted: “the Sun article was simply one of the more extreme examples of thousands of anti-foreigner articles that have appeared in UK tabloids over the past two decades. Asylum seekers and migrants have been linked to rape, murder, disease, theft, and almost every conceivable crime and misdemeanour in front-page articles and two-page spreads, in cartoons, editorials, even on the sports pages of almost all the UK’s national tabloid newspapers.”

Building on the statements, in 2016 the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance criticised UK media, particularly the UK tabloid press, over its “offensive, discriminatory and provocative terminology” including on migration.

---


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
Much research has also focused on specific instances or trends in anti-migrant hate. Academic, other media outlets and civil society have highlighted for example:

- the portrayal of Polish migrants as ‘scroungers’ or as ‘taking jobs’; ⁸⁴
- the persistent association of Muslim refugees with terrorism; ⁸⁵
- references to ‘swarms’ of migrants; ⁸⁶
- the incorrect suggestion that the UK has no-go zones for white people, controlled by Muslim populations; ⁸⁷
- the perpetuation of the ‘great replacement’ conspiracy theory through the suggestion that Muslims and Islam are taking over Europe; ⁸⁸
- the use of ‘openly biased terms such as ‘illegal’ or ‘bogus refugees’”; ⁸⁹
- the framing of North Africans, primarily Muslims, as a cultural threat and a security threat, frequently linked to terrorism; ⁹⁰
- the association of Eastern Europeans with economic burden and economic threat; ⁹¹
- the persistent connection of migrants with crime or other illegal activities; ⁹²
- The portrayal of Romanians as fraudsters, criminals, beggars, pickpockets. ⁹₃

It is clear that the UK media has employed hateful rhetoric falling under the categories defined by Stop Funding Hate, such as demonisation and dehumanisation. ⁹₄

---

⁹₄ 'What is hate speech, why does it matter and how can we tackle it?', Stop Funding Hate. Accessed 8th March 2022. https://stopfundinghate.info/about-the-campaign/what-is-hate-speech/

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
2.1 Changes in UK media coverage on migration

In more recent years, however, some media outlets in the UK have taken explicit steps to address hateful reporting. Two national newspapers have publicly reviewed their policies in relation to reporting on migration. The new editor at the Daily Express publicly reformed its approach, after the paper published 70 anti-migrant front pages in 2016 and was targeted by Stop Funding Hate. As a result of these changes, vitriolic and unequivocally hateful coverage on migration appears less common, and there seems to have been a significant reduction in attention on UK media from international society.

Yet, the issue of anti-migrant sentiment clearly has not gone away. In 2020, Clarke wrote: “official and media discourse has fed into wide-spread, normalised anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment amongst the general public.” Where research has looked at ongoing media bias, it has continued to identify instances of anti-migrant rhetoric. For example, the Centre for Media Monitoring has identified several articles from 2018-2020 where anti-migrant reporting intersects with Islamophobia.

While Soriol clearly refers to some of the more extreme examples, their comments on the use of socially acceptable language in disseminating hate appear relevant here:

Many racist groups have been able to modify their language in such a way that ensures they evade being captured by the legislation. There is emerging evidence that the speech acts of some extreme groups are becoming more sophisticated, polite and civil [see footnote for example]. As a result, many extremist groups have been able to resist being identified as hate groups and are thus protected from prosecution. Moreover, because their racist ideology is increasingly conveyed through civil and respectable language, it has become more acceptable to a wider and more diverse audience.

The focus on vitriolic or hyperbolic manifestations of hate speech can obscure the fact that reasonable or civil expressions of hate speech can also incite or stir up hatred and discrimination against minority groups, although perhaps in less obvious ways.

---


99 Sorial gives the following example: “the extreme right wing group, the Australia First Party employs the language of love and care for white Australian identity and culture to justify its policies of zero-net migration and the abolition of multiculturalism.” Sorial, Sarah. “Hate speech and distorted communication: Rethinking the limits of incitement.” Law and Philosophy 34.3 (2015): 299-324.
What Soriol points out is that hateful discourse may be concealed within language that is accepted in the public domain. Soriol’s work lays a good foundation to explain why research on more subtle expressions of media hate is needed.

3. Impacts of media hate

3.1 Direct impacts

Hateful coverage on migration in UK media may have both direct and indirect impacts. Possible direct impacts include the effect on migrants themselves through exposure to media microaggressions and prejudice against them; and incitement to a specific hate crime. Indirect impacts, discussed separately, may include the shifting of values and perspectives on migration in wider society, and the associated potential to increase hate crimes or discrimination; and the propagation and normalisation of anti-migrant hatred in communities.

Although, demonstrating the direct impacts of hate in UK media on migration is a difficult and often problematic task, academia has outlined the harmful impacts of hate crime on migrants.

Recent studies also emphasise the impacts of microaggressions, microcrimes and everyday hate. Victims face emotional harms such as greater likelihood to exhibit depressive symptoms and the exacerbation of existing trauma; as well as behavioural changes, for example avoiding certain places, withdrawal from everyday life or feeling forced to conceal nationality or asylum seeker status. However, studies found only tangentially examine the impact of microaggressions in media specifically.

Lumsden et al. have conducted some research in this area. They used semi-structured interviews and observations to examine Eastern European migrants’ experiences of and responses to hate crime before and after the EU membership vote, and found that “The issue of the media coverage was particularly important to the interviewees. Those interviewed in 2012 and 2013 believed that the media were responsible for hostility towards Poles.” They found that media discourse compounded their sense of insecurity and propagated the message “that people are not wanted in the UK.” One Polish interview noted that both local city and country newspapers provided “a space for people to actually be racist, say racist things without anything happening.” Others referenced being stereotyped, media manipulation over the idea of taking jobs, and scapegoating of Polish people.

The question of the direct impact on migrants may become even more complex when considering more subtle hateful messaging. A study by Laura Leets looked at perceptions of racist speech amongst different populations. It found that responses to direct and indirect speech varied by population and past experience. Asian Americans in fact evaluated ‘indirect’ racist speech - similar to what we would class as subtle racist speech - as the most problematic, compared to direct racist expressions. (See footnote for examples of direct and indirect racism.) This is significant given the prejudice against Asian Americans in the US. It suggests that, while hateful rhetoric will be perceived differently amongst different populations, subtle forms of hate may have just as significant an impact on those targeted.  

Demonstrating a direct correlation between media coverage and decisions made by perpetrators of hate crime in the real world is significantly challenging. As Alexander Murphy states, “establishing a causal impact from any particular instance of rhetoric is problematic given the mix of influences involved in provoking or allaying a hate crime offender.”

However, the evidence that exists is compelling. For example, a study written by a former Scotland Yard counter-terrorism officer, published in 2010, said that “a rise in the number of hate crimes against Muslims in London was being encouraged by mainstream politicians and sections of the media”, It provided prima facie and empirical evidence to demonstrate that assailants of Muslims were invariably motivated by a negative view of Muslims they have acquired from either mainstream or extremist nationalist reports or commentaries in the media.

3.2 Indirect impacts

Nonetheless, the indirect role that media coverage plays in shifting public perceptions and encouraging discrimination and hate in the real world has been widely recognised. In 2016 Christian Ahlund, chair of the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance stated, “It is no coincidence that racist violence is on the rise in the UK at the same time as we see worrying examples of intolerance and hate speech in the newspapers, online and even among politicians.”

---

103 One demonstrative example of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect racism given by Leets is as follows:

Direct: After leaving a class discussion on affirmative action, a White student says to an African/Hispanic/Asian American classmate:

“You must have some White blood in you, because most Blacks can’t make it at a White university. They just don’t have what it takes.”

“You must have some White blood in you, because most wetbacks can’t make it at a White university. They just lack the sophistication.”

“You must have some White blood in you, because most Orientals aren’t as articulate and bold in expressing their ideas. They just don’t have the same confidence.”

Indirect: After leaving a class discussion on affirmative action, a White student says to an African/Hispanic/Asian American classmate,

“You must be a good role model for Blacks/Hispanics. Your intelligence stands out.”

“You are a model Asian student. Your intelligence stands out.”


104 Murphy, Alexander. "Political Rhetoric and Hate Speech in the Case of Shamima Begum." Religions 12.10 (2021): 834.


The ‘group-threat theory’ is central to understandings of hate in society. “In this theory, when an out-group enters a country (in this case, migrants), the in-group (the hosting country’s citizens) tends to perceive them as a threat to their resources, because they will compete for them. This perception is generated by the anticipation of negative outcomes related to the migrants’ arrival, and fuels anti-immigrant attitudes. The competition can occur over “tangible (e.g., housing or labor market issues) as well as intangible goods (e.g., religious or language issues)”\textsuperscript{107}. Therefore, most of the academic studies explaining opposition to immigration and immigrants retain two main threats: the realistic threat, which has an economic and security dimension, and the symbolic threat, which is about national identity, values and clash of cultures.”\textsuperscript{107}

Clarke states: “‘Threat’ narratives are overwhelmingly utilised in media and official discourses surrounding immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees and this appears to have genuine consequences for public attitudes towards new arrivals.”\textsuperscript{108} Dempster and Hargrave in fact note that “the British press are more likely to frame refugees as potential threats to culture, welfare, security and the health system than any other country in Europe.”\textsuperscript{109}

Clarke goes on to outline the relationship between such coverage in the UK press and public perceptions of migration. She states:

The convenient scapegoating and demonising of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees has left new arrival communities particularly vulnerable as a result of relentless ‘othering’ and dehumanising… consistently, anti-immigrant media discourse tends to align with prevailing public opinion. For example, Richardson found that anti-immigration discourse predominantly makes negative assumptions about the effects of immigration on the host country’s resources, thus portraying them a realistic threat. Correspondingly, the results of a Transatlantic Trends survey found that people in the UK are more likely than comparable Western nations to say that immigrants are a ‘problem’ who take work away from citizens, drive down wages and place too much pressure on the NHS and the state education system. Furthermore, asylum seekers are frequently labelled by right-wing media and politicians as ‘cheats’ who make ‘bogus claims’, and more recently they have been depicted a threat to national security and potential terrorists despite a lack of evidence to genuinely support these concerns.\textsuperscript{110}

Clarke’s passage highlights both the importance and complexity of addressing hateful coverage on migration. Clearly, UK media is perpetuating myths around migration with little evidence. Yet, many of these myths are tied up with topics of genuine and necessary political debate, such as the welfare and national health systems and austerity.
3.3 Threat-perception

Nonetheless, when looking at drivers of hate, it will be useful to consider whether the rhetoric used is contributing to this kind of threat-perception, as well as the construction of ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’. For example, the 2018 annual report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance states, “Ideologies based on assumed incompatibility between national/ethnic or religious groups present a danger to inclusive societies,” suggesting one possible trope that may drive hate in media coverage on migration. In 2021, Połońska-Kimunguyi found that “Representations of mobility by Britain’s left-wing and centre-right newspapers reproduce visions of ‘invasion’ that, although in different ways, produce an image of a ‘threat’ to the British nation.”

It is clear that these sociological impacts can affect public behaviour. Specifically in regards to migration, Burscher, van Spanje, and De Vrese have found that negative depictions of migration increase the likelihood of anti-migrant party voting. Conzo, Pierluigi et al. looked in more depth at the impact of anti-migrant media on physiological and emotional reactions. They found that “negative media portrayals of immigrants increase the testosterone-cortisol ratio, which is a proxy for proneness to social aggression. Negative news also increases outgroup-related perceived health risk, outgroup anxiety and outgroup threat less in ethnically-homogeneous contexts. Overall, negative portrayals of immigrants generate physiological and emotional hostility toward the outgroup, and ingroup favoritism in economic transactions.”

While suggesting direct causality between media coverage, public perceptions and hate crime is problematic, it is clear that pervasive and public anti-migrant cultures can translate into violence. Brexit led to a well-documented rise in anti-migrant hate crime figures. Albornoz et al. have explored the underlying reasons for this. Their work found that hate crime increased not in leave areas - where anti-migrant sentiment was already likely to be well recognised - but in remain areas - where those with anti-migrant views were likely to have previously understood themselves as the exception not the norm. Albornoz et al. argue “behavior is dictated by the desire to conform to imperfectly observed social norms in addition to following individual preferences… the referendum result legitimized previously sanctioned views towards immigrants to be expressed publicly.” Anti-migrant hate in UK media is therefore dangerous not only in the sense that it may shift and shape individual opinion; but also in that it may present anti-migrant hate as an acceptable and widely shared norm.

Linking coverage on migration is further complicated by the fact that migration, refugee or asylum status can be ‘invisible’. Hardy and Chakrabarti write, for example, write of their work on everyday hate: “the survey sample included 77 asylum seekers and refugees and yet only 14 felt that they had been targeted because of their asylum seeker or refugee status, and instead cited their race (68 per cent), their gender (40 per cent), their dress and appearance (22 per cent), and their religion (19 per cent) as being the object of hostility. It could be argued that while discrimination is encountered by asylum seekers and refugees within the context of education, employment and housing, the asylum seeker and refugee ‘status’ is somewhat invisible within the context of everyday life.”

It is significant then that Połońska-Kimunguyi writes, “By emphasizing and making visible immigrants’ ethnicity, news media can increase citizens’ hostility towards migrants in host countries.” Meeusen and Jacobs found that “Patterns in news coverage reflect differences in prejudice: groups that are most negatively/positively evaluated by the public receive the most negative/positive coverage. Prejudice is especially high for minority groups associated with problems and criminal threat frames in the news.” Coverage on migration will play into such prejudice. The intersectional, often racialised nature of the bias shown against migrants in UK media can therefore contribute to racist attacks even if anti-migration views are not always an explicit motivating factor.

In recent years, there has been a recognised shift away from explicit hateful coverage on migration towards more subtle forms, as outlined by Clarke. While more research is needed on the impact of subtle hate, it may also play a role in both shifting and sanctioning public perceptions of migration as a threat. For example, Clarke writes: “the generally prohibited nature of overt racism and openly prejudiced behaviour has forced politicians and media representatives to engage in a much more subtle and indirect discourse but that nevertheless still reproduces negative stereotypes about immigrants.”

3.4 As a precursor to violence and even genocide

Although we have discussed some specific links between hate speech and violence elsewhere, it is worth noting that there are also some academic discussions that have introduced the notion of hate speech being at the beginning of a scale of escalation which can end in violence and even genocide.

The classic work is Gordon Allport’s 1954 exploration of how the Holocaust happened. He explored how psychological, social, economic and political processes can create a society’s incremental progression, by almost inscrutable degrees, from prejudice and discrimination to violence, because of a steady erosion of our moral and rational boundaries.

121 Allport, Gordon (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Addison-Wesley
The second well-known example of this approach is the ‘Ten Stages of Genocide’ created by Gregory Stanton, the founder of ‘genocide watch’ and the former Research Professor in Genocide Studies and Prevention at the George Mason University in Virginia. Although he does not directly refer to hate speech in his stages, the elements of classification and dehumanisation are clearly within our own definitions of subtle forms of hate in the report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stanton’s Ten Stages of Genocide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Symbolization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Polarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Persecution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Extermination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Denial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Stanton’s Ten Stages of Genocide.\(^{122}\)

\(^{122}\) www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages Accessed June 17th 2022
4. Existing work on ‘subtle hate’ and ‘drivers of hate’

4.1 Challenges in identification

Identifying instances of ‘subtle hate’ and ‘drivers of hate’ is a complex and daunting task. As the above sections have outlined, categorising even the most explicit and vitriolic forms of hate can be contentious and divisive.

Sue notes that microaggressions, which hold much in common with more subtle forms of hate, can often emerge through “well-intentioned” actions, which can even appear “admirable” or acceptable while disguising hidden bias. Their examples repeatedly show that those within the marginalised groups, familiar with patterns of discrimination and stereotyping, may detect a microaggression that the speaker cannot even perceive.123

Leets work on perceptions of subtle racist speech shows that situational factors such as group membership, ethnic group identification and previous experience mediates the perception of racist speech harm.124 We therefore know that individuals will access the severity of hateful or prejudicial speech very differently.

Perhaps for these reasons, limited literature was found explicitly examining more subtle forms or drivers of hate in the context of media coverage on migration. However, some work has been done exploring bias in media coverage that we can usefully draw on.

4.2 Literature on trends in subtle hate

In 2016, the Migration Observatory published research looking at newspaper reporting on migration over the previous decade. It found that since 2009 a growing proportion of coverage focused on the scale of migration, and that since 2010 an increasing number of reports looking at ‘limiting’ or ‘controlling’ migration. The most common modifiers identified in relation to migration were ‘mass’, ‘net’, and ‘illegal’.125 Likewise, Polońska-Kimunguyi noted that, “The papers identify migrants mostly in numeric terms. Numbers, not names, professions, or other human qualities, dominate the coverage. The newspapers describe migrants as ‘numerous’; they arrive in ‘high numbers.’ References to the scale of arrivals are explained through metaphors. Both newspapers are equally inventive, frequently applying images of natural disasters: the words ‘flow,’ ‘wave,’ ‘surge,’ ‘catastrophe,’ and ‘disaster’ are used to portray people’s movements.”126 While many uses of such words will not amount to hate, it is clear that such bias feeds into the ‘threat’ perception of migrants, thereby potentially acting as a driver of anti-migrant hate in society.


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
Also in 2016, Ethical Journalism Network published a report looking at coverage on migration from 17 countries (not including the UK) on either side of the Mediterranean. It found that:

- “the media’s reporting on migration focused almost exclusively on the thousands of people fleeing their home countries as a result of conflict or other contextual factors and the effects of these flows of people on transit and destination countries; as a result, the media also contributed to the perception that migration was “a problem” rather than a multi-faceted global phenomenon with a variety of permutations, challenges and opportunities.”
- Other aspects of migration, such as day-to-day realities, success stories and migration opportunities were far less reported on.
- Little media attention was given to migration from the country of reporting.
- Terminology remains a salient issue, with ‘migration’ generally acting as “a synonym for irregular migration.”
- A number of factors such as under-resourcing of newsrooms “often results in reporting which reduces migration to its extremes.”

Other research has focused on forms of media bias that intersect with anti-migrant coverage. The Centre for Media Monitoring’s (CFMM) report on ‘British Media’s Coverage of Muslims and Islam (2018-2020)’ monitored both online and television broadcast media daily, analysing almost 48,000 articles and 5,500 plus broadcast clips between October 2018 and September 2019. Its monitoring looked for negative and antagonistic bias within the coverage.

The report is useful both in terms of its overall approach and its specific categories for analysing bias. By taking huge volumes of coverage, CFMM were able to track more subtle trends, including linking them to specific news outlets - offering a possible model for creating an informed basis for campaigning. Each article was assessed against five metrics:

1. Association with negative aspects of behaviour
2. Misrepresentation of Muslim belief, behaviour or identity
3. Makes generalisations about Muslim belief or behaviour
4. Lack of due prominence to a Muslim voice, identity or perspective
5. Misleading or irrelevant imagery or headlines

The report found that 1% of articles about Muslims or Islam focused on immigration. Amongst these were examples of misrepresentation, generalisation, biased or irrelevant imagery, and the failure to give due prominence to alternative voices or perspectives.

Indeed, the impact of such narratives seems apparent: in the UK 18.1% of people support banning all Muslim migration, 4-6% higher than it is for other ethnic and religious groups. While not all instances of bias highlighted by the report may be labelled as ‘hateful’, it seems

---


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
fair to assume that they are reflecting and/or reinforcing Islamophobia in the wider population.

The research by CFMM suggests possible categories of bias, many of which have already been highlighted in relation to migration. For example, lack of due prominence to a migrant voice, identity or perspective can be seen in Dempster and Hargrave’s claim: “It is rare for articles to quote refugees or migrants, focus on women and children or give information on migration histories or reasons for movement.” Likewise, E. Połońska-Kimunguyi finds that “migrant voice is largely missing from the coverage. History, that could explain the causes of ‘migration’, the distant conflicts and Britain’s role in them, is also nowhere to be found.”

If we were to build on such categories for bias, we may also use the best practice guidelines for media outlined in section 5 below.

4.3 Tropes in subtle hate

CFMM have highlighted types of bias, but their work also demonstrates specific tropes that emerge through the examples given. Particularly significant in the context of anti-migrant rhetoric was the trope that Muslims and Islam are different to Britain and the West. While not all examples of this were explicitly about migration, the intersection of Islamophobia and anti-migrant narrative is clear in ideas such as the ‘great replacement theory’.

Examples from CFMM’s report include:

- “A story published in the Times Newspaper on May 06 2019, alleged that a bus driver in Paris, France had refused to allow a woman onto the vehicle because of her short skirt. The story was framed around the idea that the unnamed driver was “motivated by the hard-line beliefs that increasingly hold sway among North African immigrants.” This was pitched against the quotes from the girls’ father referencing the “Enlightenment”. The driver’s supposed beliefs (on the say-so of one girl) were used to frame the narrative of a France being run on the whims of those with extremist beliefs. Speaking through his union and later his lawyer, the driver denied the version of events given by the girls’ father Kamel Bencheikh (a French-Algerian poet and polemicist accused of Islamophobia. He alleged that despite stopping for the two girls, they continued to smoke in front of the doors of his bus at which point he drove off. Despite these details being known at the time, there was no inclusion of this rebuttal; in the piece nor was a follow-up story to clarify that the accusations against the driver, particularly him having “hard-line beliefs” were unfounded.”

---

133 The “narrative of a clandestine plot to take over Europe”.

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
• “This narrative of a clandestine plot to take over Europe adds to the suspicion around British Muslim citizens and their loyalties toward Britain. Questioning this loyalty (as well as that of other migrants) is not new. In 1990, Conservative MP Norman Tebbit most famously claimed that South Asians and Caribbeans failed the cricket test (a euphemism for British loyalty) by not supporting England in international cricket matches. Tebbit told the British politician, writer and journalist Woodrow Wyatt that he didn’t think certain immigrants would assimilate “because some of them insist on sticking to their own culture, like the Muslims in Bradford and so forth, and they are extremely dangerous.”

• A headline in Christian Today reading, “The European Church is sleeping while Islam is creeping in, says African Bishop”: “in a Christian Today article on the supposed invasion of Muslims, an African Bishop in Rome, Andrew Nkea Fuanya speaks of Christianity crumbling under an “Islamic Europe.” This gives credence to the myth of ‘Eurabia’; a conspiracy theory whose adherents claim, among other things, that Europe is heading towards “a total change… which will be more and more Islamicised and will become a political satellite of the Arab and Muslim world.”

• “Sarah Baxter, a former columnist in the Sunday Times made a sweeping statement claiming, “Here is Britain, Muslim girls’ sexual organs are being cut.”

These examples show how media can construct in-groups and out-groups, perpetuate a sense of ‘in-group threat’, and position Muslims as non-natives (or perpetual migrants) regardless of actual migration status.

Elizabeth Poole and Milly Williamson have also focused on media coverage of Muslims in the UK, looking at tropes used in the press. Focusing on the first wave of the COVID19 pandemic, they focused on four newspapers reporting during April 2020. Their work argued that news media looked to “reassert hegemonic understandings of race, migration, and welfare in the following ways: 1) the ‘massification’ of Muslims, particularly in discussions of burials, 2) the creation of a moral panic over the construction of Muslims as refusing to social distance, particularly during religious festivals, 3) and a reconfiguration of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims to acknowledge their role in the NHS while continuing to construct Muslims in general as atavistic and un-British.”

Their work is useful in suggesting tropes that we may seek to monitor or capture in this research. However, it also highlights the difficulties of meaningfully explaining bias in reporting to a public audience.

The concept of the ‘good’ migrant has long been recognised as a problematic one: Vice wrote in 2016 that through it “all immigrants are automatically deemed bad people until they somehow earn their right to be treated as humans, and to sit at the table.” More recently, many have highlighted similar patterns in relation to the Ukrainian conflict. Coverage has focused on the fact that Ukrainians are “civilised” and “look like us” in contrast to coverage on conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria. European leaders who took a hardline on resettling

---

Afghan refugees have indicated that they will take those from Ukraine. We would not want to condemn a compassionate response to those fleeing conflict. Yet, the hierarchical categorisation of migrants, particularly by ethnicity or religion, is concerning. Highlighting the disparities in reporting is therefore complex and tricky to navigate meaningfully.

Australian researchers identified dehumanising conceptions in online information operations that weaponize mainstream news to portray Muslims as:

1. Mechanically inhuman: ‘theological automats’ who are ‘unified in thought and deed’ to carry out demographic invasion. Significantly, it followed that there is no way to tell if Muslims are truly peaceable or not.

2. Subhuman: in their inherent violence, barbarism, savagery, or plan to infiltrate, flood, reproduce and replace (like disease, vermin).

Their study found headlines used basic and predictable linguistic techniques to create a cumulative and discursive effect over time. Weaponised news, sometimes falsely contextualized or re-headlined, provided a steady stream of factual proofs for extreme right narratives.

Ethical Journalism Network similarly points to a binary trend in reporting between “The emotional coverage of human loss through iconic images of human suffering and the hard realities of massive movements of population that have the potential to disrupt the living conditions, security and welfare of host communities.” Again, this demonstrates complexity in tackling biased coverage on migration: human interest stories remain crucial, even while the binary is cause for concern.

While the above highlights some specific tropes and examples, no one has yet defined specific categories of more subtle anti-migrant speech. Stop Funding Hate, Conscious Advertising Network and others have used categorisation as a useful tool for tackling more transparent hate, highlighting for example incitement to violence or discrimination, dehumanisation, demonisation, and toxic disinformation. Yet, most research appears to take a different approach when examining more subtle or hidden anti-migrant rhetoric, focusing instead on trends and patterns.

This poses an important question for our research project: is it possible to meaningfully define types of more subtle anti-migrant hate in a way that allows individual instances to be identified? Or do we need to, in addition, look for patterns in reporting?


137 Abdalla, Ally, Jabri Markwell, above n 9.

138 Distinguished from mainstream news in that they did not have editorial standards or teams, and at times, no identifiable author.


One example that clearly demonstrates the importance of trends is as follows: Polońska-Kimunguyi finds that "Throughout 2016, 84% of stories in The Times made a clear connection between migration and social benefits-seeking." Individual stories discussing the relationship between the welfare state and migration may constitute legitimate political discussion. However, such a high figure clearly shows selective reporting, which amounts to a demonisation of migrants as benefit seekers.\textsuperscript{141}

5. Responsibility of media in reporting on migration

5.1 Recognition of media responsibility

There is widespread recognition that the media has a responsibility in addressing hate. International intergovernmental work on hate has highlighted its importance in tackling both hate speech and instances of hate that do not meet the threshold for legislation. For example, the UN's Rabat Plan of Action states: "states, media and society have a collective responsibility to ensure that acts of incitement to hatred are spoken out against and acted upon with the appropriate measures... [and] all media should, as a moral and social responsibility and through self-regulation, play a role in combating discrimination and promoting intercultural understanding."\textsuperscript{142}

The role of ‘self-regulation’ is particularly important in the UK, given the nature of legislation on reporting. UK newspapers and magazines fall under the "independent regulator" (see 5.1.2 below), the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). They must follow the related "Editors’ Code of Practice", against which IPSO investigates complaints. The Editors’ Code covers areas such as harassment, privacy and intrusion into grief or shock. Its clauses on discrimination and accuracy are particularly relevant in relation to reporting on migration.

5.1.1 IPSO on discrimination

With regards to discrimination, the Editors Code states:

i) The press must avoid prejudicial or pejorative reference to an individual's race, colour, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation or to any physical or mental illness or disability.

ii) Details of an individual's race, colour, religion, gender identity, sexual orientation, physical or mental illness or disability must be avoided unless genuinely relevant to the story.\textsuperscript{143}

Significantly, both clauses refer to discrimination against an individual rather than a group, meaning that pieces on migration as a whole do not come under regulation.


Clearly many instances of hateful reporting will not fall under this definition, and IPSO has been subject to criticism on this basis. In 2019, MPs, members of the house of lords, academics and civil society organisations wrote an open letter to IPSO, stating: "In one entire year, of over 8,000 discrimination complaints, you upheld only one." IPSO responded: "Our decisions on discrimination and accuracy make it clear that a finding that there has been no breach of the Editors’ Code does not in any way imply that IPSO approves of what has been written."

The problem was perhaps illustrated most clearly in IPSO’s ruling that the Sun article by Katie Hopkins calling African migrants "cockroaches", which prompted a public statement from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemning the Sun for hate speech, nonetheless did not breach the IPSO guidelines on "discrimination". IPSO later wrote a blog post spelling out that "Groups of people are not currently protected" under their rules, and that articles which are "discriminatory against gay people in general, autistic people in general or transgender people in general" are permitted. The post then claims that discriminatory statements attacking an entire group are less harmful than statements targeting an individual because "the effect... is diluted"(!)

On the face of it then, it would appear that IPSO has created a set of institutional processes which arguably both enable and also help to legitimise UK newspaper coverage which is racist (or otherwise discriminatory) "in general" towards entire groups of people.

5.1.2 IPSO and 'independence'

It is also worth noting in this context that the notion that IPSO is properly 'independent' has been contested. The Press Recognition Panel (the official body set up following the Leveson Inquiry to assess compliance with best practice media standards) has repeatedly stated that IPSO is not actually independent at all saying, for example: "IPSO is not an independent regulator in the sense envisaged by the Leveson Report". This view is also backed up by other media reform groups, including Hacked Off.

5.1.3 IPSO on accuracy

IPSO’s Editor’s Code on accuracy is also relevant, and possibly more useful, to coverage on migration. It states:

i) The Press must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted information or images, including headlines not supported by the text.


146 https://www.ipso.co.uk/news-press-releases/blog/ipso-blog-how-clause-12-discrimination-works/

ii) A significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or distortion must be corrected, promptly and with due prominence, and — where appropriate — an apology published. In cases involving IPSO, due prominence should be as required by the regulator.

iii) A fair opportunity to reply to significant inaccuracies should be given, when reasonably called for.

iv) The Press, while free to editorialise and campaign, must distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact.

v) A publication must report fairly and accurately the outcome of an action for defamation to which it has been a party, unless an agreed settlement states otherwise, or an agreed statement is published.  

In this context, it’s particularly interesting that The Migration Observatory found decreased reporting on migration related research from think-tanks and academics; and an increase in opinion pieces on the topic. While taking this approach clearly meets iv), it may free media from the most stringent expectations with regards to accuracy.

Subtle forms and drivers of hate are likely to fall outside of media regulation. However, it can provide a useful foundation for defining media bias. The IPSO guidelines overlap in several places with the criteria used by the Centre for Media Monitoring for identifying bias in reporting in Muslims and Islam. For example, they both focus on misleading images and headlines “not supported by the text”; They note cases where “due prominence” has not been given to corrections or apologies; and they emphasise the need for right to reply.

5.2 Guidance on reporting on migration

In this way, it is also useful to look at other guidance on how the media should be reporting on migration.

Existing guidance for example covers the use of particular terms. The UN has written on why the term ‘illegal immigrant’ should not be used: because it is inaccurate (legally incorrect, misleading, ignores international legal obligations, violates principle of due process, inaccurate to describe people arriving at borders), harmful (dehumanising, criminalising, prevents fair debate, threatens solidarity and costs lives, undermines social cohesion) and against Europe’s values (discriminatory, oppressive, outdated).

The Camden Principles have provided more general guidance for reporting, which have been reiterated in the Rabat Plan of Action. It outlines five principles that media are advised to follow:

i. Taking care to report in context and in a factual and sensitive manner, while ensuring that acts of discrimination are brought to the attention of the public.


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
ii. Being alert to the danger of discrimination or negative stereotypes of individuals and groups being furthered by the media.

iii. Avoiding unnecessary references to race, religion, gender and other group characteristics that may promote intolerance.

iv. Raising awareness of the harm caused by discrimination and negative stereotyping.

v. Reporting on different groups or communities and giving their members an opportunity to speak and to be heard in a way that promotes a better understanding of them, while at the same time reflecting the perspectives of those groups or communities.¹⁵¹

Other more general guidance on coverage of migration has been provided by Ethical Journalism Network, recommending: 1) facts not bias, 2) know the law, 3) show humanity, 4) speak for all, 5) challenge hate.¹⁵²

These frameworks provide useful parameters for looking at media coverage. They pose questions for our research, including:

- Where are media outlets failing to meet these parameters?
- Where does such failure become hateful or a driver of hate?
- How do we prepare media to avoid contributing to hostility, discrimination or violence based on protected attributes like race or religion?

5.3 Media responsibility in context of government approach

Our understanding of media responsibility is, however, complicated in the context of government rhetoric on migration. In the last year, the UK government has been criticised for its inflammatory messaging. For example, in August 2021, the organisation Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor published a statement that said: “As racist attacks on asylum seekers in the United Kingdom are witnessing a sharp increase, the UK government's pervasive anti-immigrant rhetoric is extremely dangerous and may exacerbate, ignite, or increase such condemnable violence and prevarication against already vulnerable groups... The UK government must immediately change its messaging vis-à-vis asylum seekers and exert sufficient efforts to put an end to such racist attacks.”¹⁵³ The situation raises the question of the line between media and government responsibility when reporting aligns with government stance.

One example period is in November 2021, when a dingy capsized in the Channel, killing 27 people. The UK government responded with proposals for ‘push-backs’ on boats, the legality of which was challenged by senior lawyers and peers.¹⁵⁴ It also denied that the majority of


those crossing the channel were ‘genuine asylum seekers’, in contradiction of the evidence.\textsuperscript{156} Many UK media outlets reported in line with this government stance. For example, the Daily Mail repeatedly referred to ‘illegal migrants’ in relation to push backs against channel crossings.\textsuperscript{156} The term ‘illegal migrants’ is not only condemned by the UN; it also fails to recognise that the majority of those making channel crossings were asylum seekers protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention regardless of the legality of entry.\textsuperscript{157} However, highlighting the Daily Mail’s role becomes complex when its article could be seen as reporting on and / or aligning with the government’s stance.

6. The role of civil society in tackling media hate

6.1 Recognition for role of civil society

The importance of civil society in tackling hate has been widely recognised. Writing about countering hate speech online, UNESCO for example recognises that the spectrum of hate - with many instances falling outside of legislation - requires a broad spectrum of responses.\textsuperscript{158}

While Article 19 focuses on Freedom of Speech and emphasises the importance of protecting even hateful speech under law, it also recognises the value of civil society intervention:

Civil society plays a critical role in advancing the protection and promotion of human rights – even where this may not be a central part of their mandate. Their activities can be central in responding to ‘hate speech’ as they can provide the space for formal and informal interactions between people of similar or diverse backgrounds, and platforms from which individuals can exercise freedom expression and tackle inequality and discrimination. At the local, national, regional and international levels, civil society initiatives are among the most innovative and effective for monitoring and responding to incidents of intolerance and violence, as well as for countering “hate speech.” Civil society initiatives are often designed and implemented by the individuals and communities most affected by discrimination and violence, and provide unique possibilities for communicating positive messages to and educating the public, as well as monitoring the nature and impact of discrimination.\textsuperscript{159}


\textsuperscript{156} E.g. Robinson, Martin, ‘Church of England says there is no evidence of asylum seekers faking conversions to Christianity to abuse the immigration system and avoid being sent back to Muslim countries as MPs demand probe’, \textit{The Daily Mail Online}, (17th November 2021). Accessed 8th March 2022. \url{https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10211397/Priti-Patel-accuses-church-helping-asylum-seekers-game-converting-Christianity.html}


\textsuperscript{158} Gagliardione, Iginio; Gal, Danit; Alves, Thiago; and Martinez, Gabriela, ‘Countering Online Hate Speech’ from Unesco Series on Internet Freedom, Unesco. \url{http://egalitecontreleracisme.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/countering_online_hate_speech_3.pdf}

Article 19 provides a range of examples of possible interventions. Most examples focus on counteracting discrimination through integration, ‘positive messages’ and education.

Others have also commented on the role of civil society in directly tackling hateful coverage. In 2018, the UN published its Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which suggested that states could be “investing in ethical reporting standards and advertising, and stopping allocation of public funding or material support to media outlets that systematically promote intolerance, xenophobia, racism and other forms of discrimination towards migrants, in full respect for the freedom of the media”. While the suggestions focus on states, they recognise the value and validity of defunding media that promotes intolerance. A blog on the decision, published on the United Nations Human Rights website, further recognised the role of civil society organisations such as Stop Funding Hate and Conscious Advertising Network in “consciously changing the way advertising operates as well as the ad content that is produced.”

Conscious Advertising Network (CAN) is a voluntary coalition of 70 organisations set up “to ensure that industry ethics catches up with the technology of modern advertising.” Its manifesto outlines recommendations for advertisers, including on their approach to media. Regarding hate speech, it states that advertisers should “Avoid advertising with media outlets that fuel hatred on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, migration status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, disability or any other group characteristic. In assessing whether a publication or platform has crossed the line, we will be guided by international human rights principles, including those outlined in the United Nations-backed Rabat Plan of Action… Through our advertising choices, we will seek to positively support media outlets that align with the best practice guidelines outlined in the Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality.”

With regards to disinformation, CAN states that advertisers should: “Endeavour to avoid advertising in any media which commercialise inaccuracies, distort facts, and do not clearly label opinion and conjecture, harass individuals, peddle rumours, hoaxes and conspiracy for commercial gain, or which promote misinformation about climate science or public health. And report to local regulators, the publications or platforms that do.” And “Seek to positively support, through advertising, media which display the 18 clauses of quality and trustworthy journalism set out by the Reporters Without Borders Journalism Trust Initiative (JTI), and which have been certified by the JTI.”

CAN therefore promotes both the defunding of media involved in instances of hate or misinformation, and positive support for best practice. It suggests that advertisers can

---


legitimately employ a ‘carrot and stick’ approach in their relation to media coverage on migration.

CAN appears to use a relatively high threshold for defunding misinformation, referencing serious instances of malpractice such as ‘commercialising inaccuracies’. Its Manifesto on Hate Speech suggests that companies should “Avoid advertising with media outlets that fuel hatred on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, migration status, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, disability or any other group characteristic.” As this paper has outlined, both subtle forms and drivers of hate can indeed fuel hatred in the real world and therefore sit within the CAN definition.
Part B: Interview findings

1. Introduction and background

In April and May 2022, Ethical Consumer conducted interviews with ten experts on hate speech and anti-migrant hate. Interviewees were sent key findings, examples of hate and emerging categorisations for types of subtle hate from the literature review ahead of the interviews. They were then asked about five key areas:

1. Their work and experience of subtle forms of anti-migrant hate
2. The categorisations of subtle hate emerging from the literature review
3. How to communicate (with the public, advertisers and newspapers) around subtle forms and drivers of hate
4. The appropriateness and feasibility of applying Stop Funding Hate’s campaign tactics to tackle more subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate
5. The responsibility of media when following a government line on migration

Questions were adapted to match the expertise of the interviewee. The interviews aimed to learn from other civil society interventions on hate, for example efforts to tackle anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the UK.

Those interviewed are listed on the inside front cover of this report.

Chris Hart (Professor of Linguistics at Lancaster University) and Rita Jabri Markwell (Australian Muslim Advocacy Network) also gave written feedback on key elements of the report.

2. What examples are there of more subtle hate and drivers of hate in UK media coverage on migration?

2.1 Presence and impact of subtle hate in UK media coverage of migration

Interviewees appeared to agree across the board with the importance of tackling more subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage on migration. In line with literature review findings, multiple interviewees commented a) that the media was moving towards more subtle forms of hateful expression; and b) that subtle hate had significant impacts. Several interviewees also commented on migration as a particularly important and potentially difficult area for tackling subtle hate.
“One of the things that came out from my research pretty early on was that you don’t have to name the people you hate, or you’re denigrating, or being derogatory towards to achieve your goals. You don’t have to say “immigrants are a problem,” you can say this much more subtly…

“The social, cultural, political landscape has to be constructed or established. The mainstream media and political elites are able to do this. There has to be a period of time when voices within the media, those voices within the political spaces are constructing these groups as an enemy or other….Events [like 9/11, Brexit Referendum, Lee Rigby murder] reify and reinforce the idea that this [migration, particularly Muslim migration] is where the problem is. Once you get that established you can start spouting this stuff much more subtly…. What we’re seeing now, since around the referendum time, is that these things have become much more subtle, because it’s been so embedded, so normalised…"

“Once that foundation is established when we understand that they are a “problem” that’s when we can transition into that period when it becomes much more subtle… [An anti-migrant poster] doesn’t have to say too much. It doesn’t say ‘we should stop migrants coming’; it doesn’t say ‘I hate migrants.’ What it does is give you the frame of reference to take that on board. If you’re of that persuasion, it gives you that permission [to hate].”

In the above passage, Chris Allen suggests that the media is able to move towards more subtle forms of hate while giving permission to many of the same prejudicial ideas as more vitriolic hateful expression. Several other interviewees likewise suggested that subtle hate can hold parallels with, or be as potent as, or reference and reignite more vitriolic hate. For example, Amy Clarke stated, “Media coverage is moving towards this more subtle way of saying the same thing,” and Alex Murray suggested that “subtle often just means more misunderstood.” Interviewees also commented that it could “build up a narrative over time” (Faisal Hanif), and reflected a “constant recycling” of ideas that might “enable an old idea to suddenly resurface and gain traction” (Bill Howe).

As such, interviewees referenced the role of subtle forms of hate in embedding the perception in the UK of Islam as a homogenous religion (Bill Howe and Chris Allen); shaping national and international policy discourses (Bill Howe); and having an accumulative negative emotional impact on migrants over time (Amy Clarke). Chris Allen in fact suggested that subtle forms of hate could be particularly insidious precisely because they were seen as less serious (“People don’t want to be told they’re racists or xenophobes”) while giving permission to many similar ideas.

Indeed, Pia Oberoi highlighted the particular importance of tackling subtle forms of hate in relation to migration, stating “Undocumented people tend to be that last frontier [in understanding of and tackling hate]... The blind spot in our society is undocumented migrants... It’s not protected speech: calling someone an undocumented migrant in a pejorative way is not protected... You couldn’t [legally] talk about somebody’s ethnic origin [in the same way].”
2.2 Examples of subtle hate and drivers of hate

Interviewees were presented with a table of emerging examples and categories developed during the literature review process. Across the board, interviewees appeared to agree that the examples included constituted subtle forms or drivers of hate.

2.2.1 Tropes, symbolism and generalisations

Tropes, symbolism and generalisations were highlighted as important components of subtle hate and drivers of hate. Those interviewed highlighted the following specific important tropes and generalisations, in addition to those presented to them:

- Portrayals of migrants as only single men of colour.
- Focus particularly on young men, to tap into the “fighting age men” trope used by politicians and news reporters to imply that migrants are ‘invaders’ and / or a sexual threat.
- Association of migrant groups with paedophilia, child abuse and / or grooming.
- Association of migrant groups with child marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM).
- References to ‘lefty lawyers’ defending migrants and undermining British values and democracy.¹⁶⁴
- Association with sexual assault or harassment of European women, related to the use of the term ‘rapugees’ by far right commentators.
- Association of migrant groups with crime or riots.
- Tropes around poor animal welfare, e.g. focus on Halal meat as animal cruelty.
- Suggestion that migrants are getting homes when ex-servicemen are not.
- Suggestion that migrants are unpatriotic, e.g. a bogus story that circulated on Facebook about a Tesco that refused to sell poppies because a Muslim member of staff was offended.
- Focus on veiled women as a symbol of oppression.
- Suggestions that Muslim men hate and / or want to control women.
- Suggestions that migrants are diseased, e.g. that they are bringing new (or old) diseases to the UK and should be screened and / or quarantined on arrival.
- Use of language referencing animals, such as ‘stampede of migrants crossing river’.
- Suggestions that migrants are given preferential treatment or allowed to queue jump, e.g. that migrant are given housing before others.
- References to Travellers as a ‘flood’ or ‘incursion’.

In particular, multiple interviewees mentioned the association of migrant groups with sexual assault; the focus on veiled women as a symbol of oppression; and the trope that migrants are almost exclusively young men of colour.

¹⁶⁴ E.g. McKinstry, Leo, ‘Left-wing lawyers fighting Boris Johnson's Rwanda migrant plan think they are so virtuous. But the truth is they have blood on their hands’ in Mail Online (5th May 2022). Accessed online 20th May 2022. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-10787423/LEO-MCKINSTRY-Left-wing-lawyers-fighting-Johnsons-Rwanda-migrant-plan-blood-hands.html

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
2.2.2 Trigger words and phrases

Interviewees also mentioned the importance of trigger words or phrases, such as ‘Jihadi’ ‘Sharia’ or ‘illegal’. Chris Allen argued that such language could tap into pre-existing subconscious association built up over time through tropes and generalisations: “You can use these words or phrases, like “jihad”, or “creeping Sharia” that trigger [a certain response]. There’s white noise [of associations] out there that some of these things trigger. These are in many ways subconscious processes… These things can be visual or textual.”

Bill Howe likewise discussed the way in which language and imagery relating to the military could evoke the “fighting age men” trope of migrants as invaders. Chris Hart also referenced the way in which images of male migrants often showed them standing in long queues, jumping out of lorries or climbing over/through fences.

Chris Hart also suggested that much language referred to natural disasters in order to imply threat, such as ‘tsunami of migrants’, ‘floods of migrants’.

Such language was broadly recognised to stand outside the boundaries of hate that could be tackled through legislation, partly due to its shifting nature over time. “Dog whistles and symbolism used are very hard for content regulation, and certainly for legislation…. When you’re talking about subtle forms of hate, you won’t address the issue only via regulation. The insults will change, the vitriol will change.” (Pia Oberoi)

While such comments highlight the importance of civil society interventions against these kinds of trope and trigger words, they also suggest the difficulties of tackling language that is likely to be constantly shifting. Some approaches intended to tackle these trigger words – such as keyword blocking or the removal of certain terminology – were therefore specifically highlighted as ineffective and / or potentially counter-productive. They were said to risk ‘invisiblising’ the issues – resulting in good content being taken down, while dog whistles and symbolism were able to remain. (Pia Oberoi and Harriet Kingaby, see Interview findings, 6.1 for more detail.)

2.2.3 Hierarchies

Interviewees also repeatedly referenced the way in which migrants were divided into ‘good/bad’, ‘desirable/undesirable’. In particular this process was highlighted in relation to the portrayal of Muslim men, reporting on Ukraine, and the separation of documented and undocumented migrants.

As an example, Faisal Hanif spoke about the way in which grooming gangs in Bradford had initially been named as ‘Asian grooming gangs’, then ‘Asian Pakistani grooming gangs’, and then later ‘Asian Pakistani Muslim grooming gangs’, “as a way to divide and categorise migrant populations”. He suggested that this dynamic was repeatedly seen in the way that press specifically names ‘Muslim immigrant men’ in negative new reports in a way that suggests any negative behaviour is “part of their culture”.

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
“They want to point out that not all immigrants are bad – but these particular Muslim Pakistani ones are really bad. It suggests that their religion causes them to do this.”

Likewise, multiple interviewees expressed concerns about the way in which Ukrainian refugees had been distinguished from other migrants through focus on appearance (including hair and eye colour), women and children as the majority of the refugee population, and / or their non-economic motivations.

2.2.4 Selective reporting

A number of examples of selective reporting were also given during interviews. These were:

- Selective reporting of government or third-party reports on migration
- The disproportionate use of images of Muslim women in the full face veil (said to be over 30% of images, despite less than 1% of UK Muslim population wearing the full face veil)
- Failure to consult an Islamic Mufti or Scholar as the expert sources when reporting on Islamic scripture, beliefs or practices.
- Lack of coverage of success stories, or of positive social, cultural or economic impacts.
- Lack of coverage of treatment of migrants on arrival, e.g. in immigration detention centres.

2.2.5 Misleading and / or inaccurate reporting

Likewise, some further examples of inaccuracies were provided:

- The use of the phrase ‘stricter Sharia law’ in the context of regimes for example banning girls from attending school, despite the fact that such policies are widely considered to violate Sharia law, by the Sunni Muslim community.
- Labelling of ISIS as a Sunni Muslim group despite the fact that over 10,000 Sunni Muslims, including many leaders, have signed a letter to say that they do not recognise the group within Sunni Islam.
- Suggestion of large numbers of migrants continually arriving in a short time frame, for example ‘400 migrants arrive every day’.

2.3 Disproportionality

Multiple interviewees commented that subtle hate was often to do with repetitions of a trope or disproportionality in reporting rather than individual instances of hateful expression.

Amy Clarke suggested that important aspects of subtle hate were the frequency, the sheer amount of coverage given to an issue and the way in which this problematised an issue even if its actual impact was small. She commented, “A single article may be fairly neutral in tone, but it still says something that this [issue] is being reported on so frequently.” Mike Ainsworth likewise suggested: “it’s about the disproportionate response.”
In the use of the above tropes, trends and generalisation, disportionality and repetition were felt to be central in distinguishing subtle hateful expressions within reporting. For example, Bill Howe referenced the frequency of articles relating migrants to child abuse or grooming. Chris Allen referenced the predominance of images of Muslim women wearing the full face veil in media (a much higher rate than in the general population). Chris Hart discussed the number of articles suggesting that public services could not cope with the number of migrants.

The importance of communicating patterns, trends and volume is therefore explored further in section 4.2.1.

3. Is it possible to classify or otherwise identify more subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate?

3.1 Comments on emerging categorisations

The notion of classifying subtle forms of hate largely appeared popular amongst interviewees as a “tool” for understanding this area. One interviewee commented “if you can name it, if you can describe it, it’s power.” Another suggested, “Those categories help people break down those wider phenomena.”

“If people don’t have words for it, it’s not a thing. Giving a narrative casing for subtle forms of hate is unbelievably helpful.” (Harriet Kingaby)

Ahead of the discussion, interviewees were presented with a table of possible categories of subtle hate that had emerged from the literature review and were asked for feedback and comments. All interviewees said that the categories looked likely to be useful. It was commented that they looked “nearly complete”.

The general approach taken to classification was also supported by interviewees. Limor Simhony Philpott, for example, suggested that the development of ‘broad’ categories was well suited to the topic of migration.

“We try to break things down to the most common misconceptions and conspiracies about Jews. This works because anti-Semitism is more specific… In your case, it’s probably a bit more complicated because immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers come from so many different places. You have a whole group of different factors there that can influence [hate]… You have prejudices about people coming from Africa, or people coming from Eastern Europe. For you it’s more complicated, because immigrants can come from all different places, whereas for us its anti-Semitism: it’s more clear cut… This categorisation makes more sense when it comes to migration as it’s broader.”
Pia Oberoi likewise commented that it was “Really good to put these all out there so you have a full range.”

Individual categories suggested were also commented on, with multiple interviewees in particular highlighting the importance of including ‘Intersectional prejudice’, which was said to “often hit the most” in terms of impact on migrant communities.

### 3.1.1 Including affected communities

Some comments were made about the methodology behind classifying such forms of subtle hate and the need to include migrants in such work. Pia Oberoi in particular emphasised the “importance of engaging with migrant communities and their advocates in being part of the effort to confront these kinds of things.” In particular, she suggested that the identification of examples of problem terms “needed to be done by those affected… and happen at a local level”.

Amy Clarke likewise commented that the Centre for Hate Studies at the University of Leicester “tried to include victims as much as possible in their work.” However, she also cautioned that it was important to think about the ethics of this: “You don’t want to over-rely on victims telling their stories.”

While migrant rights organisations have been involved in this work, and many reports in the literature review worked directly with affected communities, it was beyond the scope of this research to engage directly with migrant communities (for example through focus groups).

### 3.2 Amends to categorisation

The interviews highlighted some possible amends to or considerations around specific categories, particularly ‘Inaccuracies’.

#### 3.2.1 Inaccuracy

Discussions highlighted the need to clarify the spectrum of poor reporting included under ‘Inaccuracy’. Faisal Hanif for example highlighted the importance of ‘misrepresentation’ as a subsection of ‘inaccuracy’, as included in the Centre for Media Monitoring Report on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in British press.

On the other end of the spectrum, Mike Ainsworth noted the importance of also highlighting the role of ‘fakes’: “inaccurate implies a small tweak, rather than a total lie or untruth.” One example of fakes provided in interviews was the doctoring of an image of a Muslim woman to add the full face veil.

In light of these comments, we have amended this category to be ‘Misrepresentation, inaccuracy or fake’.
3.2.2 Misuse of terms/ miscategorisation

The subcategory ‘Misuse of terms/ miscategorisation’ was also highlighted as an area for possible further consideration. Pia Oberoi in particular highlighted the difficulty of pointing to incorrect use of terminology while ensuring that you do not reinforce the ‘good/bad’ migrant hierarchy.

“You can create a ‘basket of undesirability’ that contains for example ‘illegal migrant’ or ‘economic migrant’, and you’re always relegating someone to that basket. It suggests that not all humans are equal, and creates an ingroup and an outgroup… How do you take the sting out of some of these terms? This idea that ‘irregularity’ is somehow wrong is something we are really trying to turn around.”

In light of these comments, we have adapted the title of this subcategory to remove the term ‘miscategorisation’ and focus on the misuse of terms like ‘illegal’, rather than including the example of media ‘Calling refugees migrants etc.’

3.2.3 Scapegoating

Many interviewees also referenced the way in which migration is conflated with other socioeconomic issues:

“We need to think about how we’re asking papers to message. For media that is interested in an honest portrayal of migration, absolutely, I don’t think we should be asking them to shy away from asking honest questions, as the watchdog that they are. But they need to be sensitive to terminology… and make sure that if you’re talking about migrant arrivals don’t immediately pivot to the housing crisis if you know full well that the housing crisis has nothing to do with those arriving. Or if you’re going to make that argument, make it empirically, make it with figures that demonstrate how… Don’t accept narratives that aren’t right.” (Pia Oberoi)

Based on this, we have added an additional subcategory under ‘Inaccuracy’ for scapegoating. It would be interesting to see this added to media reporting best practice guidelines like those outlined in section 5.2 of the literature review.

3.3 Possible uses of categorisation

Interviewees also commented on possible uses for and limitations of this kind of categorisation. The categories were widely regarded as a “useful tool” for those working on subtle hate in particular. For example, they were said to be a “fantastic” resource for possible Stop Funding Hate supporters. Bill Howe suggested that they could be a useful tool for counternarrative work, and training new volunteers engaging in conversations on hate. Rita Jabri Markwell highlighted anti-dehumanisation standards for news outlets to provide guidance to both media and conscious advertisers. This suggestion is explored further in section 6.2.
Alex Murray from the Conscious Advertising Network also suggested that the categorisation could be a useful additional resource for advertisers “as a tool for drawing a line”. However, he stated that it would need to be provided alongside other engagement work: “It’s useful but you need to be able to tell a story with it. To get that compelling story, it has to include real voices.” This suggestion is explored further in section 4.2.3 below.

3.4 Possible limitations to categorisation

Chris Allen in particular highlighted potential drawbacks to using the categories with some audiences. He suggested that the rigid nature of classifying subtle forms of hate could be a distraction from tackling actual forms of subtle hate if used to try and convince journalists and critics of the campaign:

“If people don’t want to work on it – no matter how hard you try – they aren’t going to accept it [the definitions]. You then get into trying to justify your definitions or your categories. It’s a very clever tactic by the people generating the hate: ‘let’s focus on the definitions or the categories because until we get that, we don’t know what that stuff [the hate] is’.”

Dr. Jenni Berlin also suggested that careful thought would need to go into communicating the categories to the “wider majority”. “I guess it’s repetition and giving examples and giving stories.” (Communication is explored in more detail in section 4 below.)

4. Is it possible to communicate subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate to a wider audience?

4.1 Feasibility of communicating more subtle forms and drivers of hate

All interviewees were asked about the feasibility of and techniques for communicating more subtle forms and drivers of hate to the general public. This topic was discussed in depth with those from the Anti-Semitism Policy Trust, Stop Hate UK and the Conscious Advertising Network, to learn from their experiences explaining anti-Semitism, conducting counter narrative work, and challenging both hate and climate misinformation respectively.

Overall, interviewees expressed mixed opinions on the feasibility of communicating subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate. While some expressed confidence that it could be done in a simple way, others suggested that it was “very difficult”. “Nuance and subtlety is lost in the public, political, media spaces… it’s a massive challenge trying to talk to people about these subtle ways.” (Chris Allen)

Many interviewees provided key suggestions for how more subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate might be explained to supporters, advertisers and media:

- Focus on trends, patterns and volume of subtle hate and drivers of hate
- Demonstrate the impact of subtle hate – focus on harms

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
● Include personal stories and migrant voices
● Draw on understandings of other forms of prejudice
● Ensure that you do not demonise those holding prejudicial views
● Use and compare examples to explain what does and doesn’t constitute hate
● Explain the origins and history of tropes
● Support the public to anticipate tropes likely to appear in the media
● Build wider media literacy
● Focus on national and international standards, and demonstrate that these have not been met by media outlets in the UK

Each of these is explored further in a section below.

Most interviewees referenced a range of the above approaches rather than suggesting one particular tactic, and Harriet Kingaby and Alex Murray specifically stated “telling the story has lots of components”. They suggested that persuading advertisers required combining, for example, statistics from think tanks, real life stories of impacts and incidents that have got that particular corporation to the table.

4.2 Techniques for communicating subtle forms and drivers of hate

4.2.1 Focusing on trends, patterns and volume

As explored above (2.4), subtle hate was frequently said to be characterised by the disproportionality of focus on certain topics, the sheer quantity of certain reports or the repetition of tropes or ideas. Multiple interviewees therefore also discussed the importance of focusing on trends, patterns and volume in communicating more subtle hate. They emphasised that this was important in terms of campaigners’ own understanding, in terms of building public condemnation, and in terms of convincing media organisations to change practices.

Multiple interviewees emphasised that focusing on trends, patterns and volume would help to convince the public that subtle hate faced by migrants is a major issue:

“In isolation all of these more subtle forms of hostility don’t appear to be particularly problematic to most people. But I think in demonstrating how many examples you have here [in the categorisation table], there is something to be said.” (Amy Clarke)

“If you’ve got one subtle example it’s open to interpretation. If you’ve got 20 you can show a pattern… I think that [showing a pattern] works ... Those who are on the ‘I don’t care end’, you won’t convince them. But when people are in the middle or open to be convinced, but are unconvinced at the moment, giving them trends and patterns and those examples, that works beautifully well.” (Chris Allen)
“You have to have the evidence. You can’t rely on isolated instances or examples as people can make mistakes, they have their own worldview and biases or it could simply be a matter of lack of time or resources. One example is not useful evidence in itself. Collate a body of evidence and then make an argument about why you believe it’s a very problematic phenomena.” (Faisal Hanif)

Interviewees likewise commented that this was central to communicating the issue to advertisers:

“On the subject of the subtler forms of hate it’s [about] trying to show how what in a very isolated case can be a factual piece of reporting, but with a sustained approach has a very different impact…. It’s about that fact that when you’ve got time after time a front page piece that talks about migrants, even if it’s a factual piece of reporting.. what that cumulative effect has there.” (Alex Murray)

“Essentially it’s about evidence… Editors have fallen back on: ‘you make these claims without evidence.’” (Faisal Hanif)

Bill Howe also highlighted the importance of monitoring trends to understand the patterns of hate that were emerging:

“There is absolutely a need to monitor trends… The currents are changing constantly, reacting to geopolitics, but they can also be reacting to something that happens on a neighbourhood level… This can feed very quickly through social media into a national discourse and into an international discourse.”

Finally, interviewees commented that demonstrating patterns and trends would ensure that the campaign was robust against critics:

“You’ve got to set it up in a way that they can’t come back at you. Having that, showing that, presenting those patterns and themes and the recurrence and the way in which it’s used [will help]… you will see the similarities, those similarities are there, you don’t need to look to hard to find them – but sometimes you need to pull the curtain back and let people see it.” (Chris Allen)

### 4.2.1.1 Approaches to demonstrating trends, patterns or volume

Interviewees mentioned a variety of approaches to demonstrating trends, patterns and volume. Several interviewees discussed more formal approaches such as concerted monitoring and civil society reporting, while others suggested more informal techniques such as using images to demonstrate repetition.

Faisal Hanif, Chris Allen and Alex Murray all referenced formal tracking and/or reporting on media trends. Chris Allen mentioned the use of keyword tracking (for example looking at the way in which Islamist or Jihadi is being used). Faisal Hanif discussed the value of the kind of in depth report conducted by the Centre of Media Monitoring on portrayals of Islam and Muslims in UK media (discussed in section 4.2):
“It gives us a huge body of evidence. Once you put it on paper in clear daylight, the number of examples in and of themselves makes it very difficult for people to argue against it by saying there isn’t a problem… Even editors of right wing papers have recognised a serious problem here [in UK media coverage on Muslims and Islam, following civil society work evidencing the issue].”

Faisal Hanif also highlighted that tracking a pattern can help to identify areas that the media is leaving out, for example the failure to give due prominence to expert voices. “Once you identify a pattern with the journalist or publication, you can ask them why they haven’t included this perspective or that particular expert.”

Based on learning from the Centre for Media Monitoring’s own tracking work, he suggested key areas to consider if designing a monitoring project:

- Covering a range of media organisations, including left-leaning, right-leaning and religious media;
- Covering a range for key reporting components, including headline, imagery, text bias and overall leaning of the article;
- Including the option for articles to be categorised as “inconclusive”, to recognise the element of doubt; and disagreement
- Ranking and comparing publications as a whole;
- Tracking certain types of reporting, for example commentary articles (which have greater leniency under IPSO regulations, and sometimes drive hateful coverage)

Others also suggested more informal approaches. For example, several interviewees suggested that patterns and trends could be presented in a visual way. They referenced how useful Stop Funding Hate’s previous images of multiple instances of anti-migrant hate had been in demonstrating the sheer quantity of evidence and scale of the problem (see below for an example of Daily Express headlines).
Amy Clarke also suggested that some of the work in identifying subtle forms of hate could be done by the public "as long as people knew what they were looking out for. It might be that within the course of a month, 'I've noticed that you've published this many articles. Or that you've got contradictory articles. Or that you've got arguments from this perspective but not this perspective.' Education is key."

In a learning from the analogous case of anti-social behaviour\textsuperscript{165} disputes with neighbours, it is possible that individuals could be encouraged to 'keep a diary' with dates and evidence of articles they had seen and how this had made them feel.

**4.2.2 Demonstrating the impact of subtle hate – focusing on harms**

A number of interviewees also suggested that demonstrating harms from subtle forms of hate was crucial to persuading advertisers and the public.

Examples of how harm could be demonstrated included:

- Demonstrating impacts on public sentiment
- Using facts and figures to show the proportion of people who hold prejudice about migrants
- Using facts and figures to demonstrate prejudice against certain groups of migrants, e.g. those from African countries or Muslims
- Emphasising the cumulative impact on "either readers who then go away feeling more angry and hostile or for someone who identifies as a migrant or looks like them, who then goes away thinking this country clearly hates me because they constantly report like this" (Amy Clarke)
- Including migrant stories and experiences (see section 4.2.3)

Demonstrating impact was also seen as an effective way to rebut suggestions that concerns were merely about “political correctness” or the perception of things as “offensive”. “Use the triangle of hatred [which shows a spectrum of hatred from lawful hate to incitement to genocide, see section 1.1.2 of the literature review]. It’s about stopping people from going down this road.” (Mike Ainsworth)

While Amy Clarke suggested that such critics did not really need to be on board with a campaign around subtle hate in order for it to be effective, she stated that ensuring supporters understood impacts was likely to help them feel confident against likely backlash on Twitter, suggesting that they were being “sensitive or a snowflake”.

**4.2.3 Including personal stories and migrant voices**

Interviewees repeatedly emphasised that sharing personal stories and experiences of how subtle hate has impacted migrants was key to building public awareness and condemnation.

"In terms of the public, one of the things from my research that’s worked… people do still buy into the idea of the human story – around humanisation and personalisation… [When] I’ve worked in hostile environments… I’ve started with real stories talking about

\textsuperscript{165} see e.g: https://asbhelp.co.uk/gathering-evidence/
real people… it’s very difficult for people to come back [in response to a real story] and go ‘yeah, but…” (Chris Allen)

Indeed, several interviewees spoke about findings from counter-narrative work that emotional appeals and personal stories had a far higher rate of success in changing hateful perspectives than facts or figures.

“People weren’t responding to facts. The way that misinformation and fake truth can be used doesn’t bear any relationship to reality… An appeal to common humanity, dignity, human values works much better than looking at factual arguments.” (Bill Howe)

“Most of this is about emotions and values rather than facts and figures.” (Pia Oberoi)

While such an approach could help to explain subtle forms of hate, it was also considered vital in ‘rehumanising' migrant communities as a more direct response to current hateful narratives.

“Policy makers have utilised the distinctions between people. How do you build up these basic humanity arguments?” (Pia Oberoi)

“One of the things that Farage, that the Conservatives, that the far right have done is they have completely dehumanised migrants. They’re not people anymore, they are [seen as] the parasites… I think there is a need for rehumanisation of migrants and refugees. Personalising. Bring them back to life.” (Chris Allen)

However, Amy Clarke, also referenced the need to carefully consider ethics when sharing personal migrant stories, making sure not to “over-rely on victims”. She suggested that using testimonies, for example alongside animations, could be a good way to tackle this.

4.2.4 Using and comparing examples to explain what does and doesn’t constitute subtle hate or drive hate

Limor Simhony Philpott suggested that using examples was a useful way to help people understand what to look out for in regards to subtle hate. “We [the Anti-Semitism Policy Trust] don’t have an exhaustive list, but do have just examples of words, phrases and concepts that are anti-Semitic, and why, where do they come from?” She suggested that the ‘examples of speech’ column on the categorisation table could play a similar role.

“Having something like this [a list of examples] is really great because it means people will immediately be able to recognise it, and say ‘ah, that’s the word’. Criminals, and cheating and violence and all that. Putting that next to the word refugees or illegal immigrants will immediately frame it in a negative way… It’s a visual way to make people understand why it makes them uncomfortable and why it affects the way they view immigrants.”

She stated that The Anti-Semitism Policy Trust used such examples to help people understand the difference between anti-Semitism and legitimate discussion. For example,
she stated that they would use two cartoons “to show the difference between for example a
caricature… that depicts Jews as some kind of animals or vermin, blood-drinking, all those
old tropes, that is anti-Semitism… [and] a depiction of the Israeli Prime Minister war
mongering, that’s legitimate criticism, that’s fine.”

Using examples in this way may be particularly useful in communicating subtle hate, where it
can be more difficult to understand the boundary with legitimate reporting.

4.2.5 Explaining the origins and history of subtly hateful tropes

Limor Simhony Philpott stated that explaining the origins and history of certain tropes could
also be useful, and was a key element of training offered by the Anti-Semitism Policy Trust.

In particular, she highlighted that such an approach could help people understand where
something “might not sound like a bad thing but does come from some old anti-Semitic
trope.” This is particularly relevant in the context of subtle hate, which interviewees said was
often “misunderstood” and harder for the public to identify.

Limor Simhony Philpott and Chris Hart highlighted one example from the intersection on anti-
Semitism and anti-migrant hate: the portrayal of migrants as vermin was also employed
against Jewish refugees during the Second World War. Explaining such origins may help
the public to understand why even subtle versions of this trope (e.g. use of words like
’swarm’) have deeply problematic connotations.

However, Limor Simhony Philpott did also highlight potential difficulties with this approach:

“It’s probably a bit more complicated because immigrants, refugees and asylum
seekers come from so many different places. You have a whole group of different
factors there that can influence [hate]... You have prejudices about people coming from
Africa, or people coming from Eastern Europe. For you it’s more complicated, because
immigrants can come from all different places, whereas for use its anti-Semitism: it’s
more clear cut.”

Dr. Jenni Berlin also discussed a technique used by the Traveller Movement to combat anti-
Traveller hate – comparing a common trope or generalisation to reality. For example, she
stated that they compare the suggestion that “Travellers can do whatever they want” with
evidence on the over-policing and disproportionate incarceration of, and police discrimination
against, Roma, Gypsy and Traveller communities.

4.2.6 Supporting the public to anticipate subtly hateful tropes likely to appear in the
media

Harriet Kingaby highlighted a key technique used by the movement tackling climate
misinformation: preempting the misinformation that the public are likely to be told.

166 Background on this in Karpf, Anne, ‘We’ve been here before’, in The Guardian, (8th June 2002). Accessed
“Let people know the lies they’re going to be told. You can either discredit the actors, for example ‘He would say that because he’s got investments over here. He’s bought and paid for.’ Or you might say, ‘This newspaper is going to tell you this: they’re going to tell you X story three times this week, or they’re going to point you to this court case’… Give people something sticky that allows them to say, ‘Ah, I’m not listening to that.’”

Harriet suggested that the categorisations of subtle hate could be used in this way, building on models employed by the movement tackling climate misinformation:

“John Cooke has something called FLICC. It’s a deconstruction of logic fallacies in arguments. I’ve seen it as cards that people can post. If someone’s using an ad hominem attack, or a slippery slope argument, you can literally download a little thing and post it on their argument. It really helps… This [the categorisations] are super helpful for advertisers [to spot subtle hate]: ‘is the content doing this? Aha! It is.’”

This approach could be used alongside examples and / or explaining the history and origins of certain anti-migrant sentiments, so that they were quickly identifiable and understood.

4.2.7 Focusing on the failure to meet national and international standards

Several interviewers reiterated the importance of referring to national and international standards for migration reporting, and demonstrating that these had been broken, in communicating subtle forms of hate. This was seen as particularly important in engaging with advertisers.

Harriet Kingaby stated that advertisers were more likely to apply widely recognised “clear red lines” that allow them to differentiate hateful content from unsavoury content, for example, and ensure that they could not be accused of influencing editorial policy. She suggested that
reference to international standards such as the Camden and Rabat Principles was therefore vital. Pia Oberoi likewise commented that making reference to existing national benchmarks on hate and hateful speech, such as the Conscious Advertising Network’s Manifesto on Hate, was important.

Rita Jabri Markwell agreed that clear red lines were important and argued that anti-dehumanisation standards would provide this function. She also argued the Rabat Principles supported the development of industry standards as a lever to capture hatred that may not be easily or appropriately regulated by civil law.

4.2.8 Drawing on understandings of other forms of prejudice

Several interviewees discussed the fact that anti-migrant hate was often less well understood than other forms of prejudice such as racism or anti-Semitism.

This was seen as a challenge for supporting the public to understand more subtle forms of anti-migrant expression. However, some interviewees suggested that drawing parallels or links with better understood forms of prejudice could support increased understanding.

Limor Simhony Philpott suggested that one way of doing this could be demonstrating how certain anti-Migrant prejudices intersect with prejudice against specific racial or ethnic groups: “People don’t want to see themselves as racist.”

Stop Funding Hate could explore possibilities for tapping into better understood forms of hate such as racism, in order to support better understandings of subtle hate against migrants. For example, this could be highlighting certain racialised tropes against particular migrants.

4.2.9 Referring to the Ukrainian situation to expose the hierarchy

As referenced above, multiple interviewees discussed the way in which subtly hateful reporting involves a ‘hierarchy’ of migrants often defined along racial lines. Interviewees in particular referenced the differences between reporting on Ukrainian refugees and those from other nations.

Both Chris Allen and Bill Howe suggested that this could be an opportunity in terms of rehumanising other migrants and unpicking the hierarchy.

“Ukrainian asylum seekers are not dehumanised… I’ve seen so much about who they are, real life stories… Maybe the Ukraine refugee situation is - if you’re talking about patterns – an opportunity to say look at this and now look at this: both are fleeing war, both are fleeing oppression… How you frame this, that’s the challenge.” (Chris Allen)

“The way that the media has been presenting the stories of people coming out of Ukraine, and the difference between that and those coming out of the Middle East gives us all an opportunity to say, ‘look, have you noticed this? Have you noticed the difference?’… From having lots of experience of counter narrative, you have to appeal to common humanity. You have to say, ‘What’s the difference between a woman and a
child crossing the border into Moldova or somebody who’s stuck in Belarus?... Their kids are still cold, they’re still hungry, they’re scared.” (Bill Howe)

4.2.10 Ensuring that you do not demonise

A theme throughout discussions on communication, in many of the interviews, was the importance of ensuring that those holding subtle hateful views against migrants were not demonised.

“It’s important to acknowledge the person on the other side of the fence, that they’ve got an opinion, how it’s been formed, what are they ignoring or omitting or not acknowledging.” (Bill Howe)

“People are more receptive to not being told off, but being explained things from somebody else’s point of view. They’re often horrified to know that something they’ve said or done contains something anti-Semitic.” (Limor Simhony Philpott)

“You don’t descend into hateful rhetoric yourself... It’s about developing dialogue.” (Mike Ainsworth)

Careful use of language was emphasised in this context, with Limor Simhony Philpott saying that the Anti-Semitism Policy Trust “wouldn’t necessary call people anti-Semites” but might instead emphasise that they hold some level of anti-Semitic views.

In fact, Limor Simhony Philpott in particular suggested that demonstrating how widespread prejudice is in society can support people to acknowledge the problem and become less defensive about examining their own views:

“We [The Anti-Semitism Policy Trust] use facts and figures. We say, ‘we’ve done our research and X number of people will hold some level of anti-Semitic views, and I think that kind of shocks people a bit.... It makes people think – ‘Oh wow, say 5% of the population is anti-Semitic, but 30%, which is a lot, hold some form of anti-Semitic views. It makes people think about: what do you mean? And why do so many people believe those things?’ The surprise value seems to be conducive.”

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
5. Can Stop Funding Hate tactics tackle more subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate?

5.1 Feedback on potential for Stop Funding Hate campaign

The majority of interviewees were positive about the potential of a Stop Funding Hate campaign in this area. Interviewees referenced the previous successes of the campaign; the significance of its tactics to economically incentivise change; the importance of its commercial angle in the context of an “unfit for purpose complaints body”; and the way in which Stop Funding Hate was able to make a material argument that cut through debate around ‘political correctness’.

Stop Funding Hate’s approach was highlighted as potentially more effective than other work in this area: “[it] can be more effective than dealing with the costs and consequences on a one-to-one basis.” (Bill Howe)

However, interviewees also highlighted potentially difficulties, and one interviewee expressed major doubt about whether a campaign of this kind could be successful within the current political context:

“There will be more of a backlash… It will be seen as oversensitive.” (Amy Clarke)

“The frame at the moment has been around individual articles and individual posts. That’s the conversation we have with the platforms… We need to reframe this conversation to be less about individual posts and authors and more about national hate campaigns.” (Harriet Kingaby)

“I think it will be really difficult for Stop Funding Hate to make inroads while you have this government background. If they’re [the newspapers are] saying things no more extreme than what government ministers are saying, it’s really difficult to hold them to account… It’s absolutely the right place for Stop Funding Hate to be, but I don’t believe they’ll be in any way successful… In other areas of this work [though], they have been the most successful organisation… It may be worth doing it [a campaign] knowing that it’s going to fail because it’s effectively calling out politicians [if papers are following a hateful government line].” (Mike Ainsworth)

One interviewee thought that focusing on dehumanization would be way to reduce backlash as it can be linked to historical and present day violence (Rita Jabri Markwell)
5.2 Key necessary components for a Stop Funding Hate campaign

Several interviewees suggested that a campaign of this kind would “require a different approach” (Chris Allen). Some highlighted key necessary components, in particular:

- evidence of a pattern or trend;
- evidence of the cumulative effect of more subtle forms of hate;
- and public support behind the campaign.

“I think you can [campaign on this issue using Stop Funding Hate tactics] if you have a body of evidence. I wouldn’t personally do it with an isolated one word or one sentence. I think if you can match that to a particular body of evidence and say, ‘look, this is what we found across the board. This is what they’ve printed here. This is the kind of thing a newspaper does on a particular subject. This is the evidence... Why are you advertising here? They have a clear agenda against this community, so what are you doing here?’ [that could work].” (Faisal Hanif)

“I think Stop Funding Hate can still work for these more subtle forms of hate, they just need to get buy-in from people.” (Amy Clarke)

5.3 Role within a larger ecosystem

Several interviewees also emphasised that Stop Funding Hate played a role within an “ecosystem” of different civil society interventions. They commented on ways in which a campaign of this nature could have knock-on positive impacts for the larger ecosystem of anti-hate campaigners, including by:

- bringing the issues into the public domain;
- providing a “narrative casing” and framework within which to understand more subtle forms of hate;
- helping to provide tools for those campaigning on regulators such as IPSO by highlighting areas that regulators are not currently addressing;
- shifting the ‘Overton Window’ and reframing the conversation around subtle hate campaigns rather than just individual articles and posts;
- and ensuring that advertisers have to “get around the table” on the issue of more subtle forms of hate and push for solutions through coalitions like the Conscious Advertising Network.
5.4 Targeting allies and / or the central ‘can be convinced’ group

Multiple interviewees referenced the value of working with or targeting either allies or the middle ‘can be convinced’ group – in terms of supporters for the campaign, journalists and advertisers.

“If you’re speaking about this to journalists and media spaces, you have to prioritise those who have bought into it. You have to ignore the people who won’t buy into it. Allyship should be the way that you prioritise work.” (Chris Allen)

“Focus on the middle section [of the public]... Education is key... I think there’s probably a very willing audience there who probably want to crack down on the more subtle forms of hostility but perhaps they don’t know how to challenge it if it’s not overt.” (Amy Clarke)

“The stuff Stop Funding Hate does will work with some people and not with other people. The more support and resources you can provide for those who do buy into what you do – that’s fantastic.” (Bill Howe)

Faisal Hanif spoke about similar experiences in terms of media response to the Centre for Media Monitoring’s report on reporting on Islam and Muslims in the UK. “We got a mixed response. Some journalists appreciate it. It gives evidence and tips on what can be done better. There is another group who are not interested and don’t like the idea of Muslims having a voice in public.”

6. To what extent are marketing and advertising departments open to tackling more subtle forms and drivers of anti-migrant hate?

This topic was in particular discussed with members of the Conscious Advertising Network and Pia Oberoi. Written questions were also sent to a member of the advertising industry.

6.1 ‘Overton Window’ for conscious advertising

Alex Murray and Harriet Kingaby from the Conscious Advertising Network discussed the way in which the conversation about advertising responsibility and brand safety had shifted to become more conscious in recent years. They suggested that the ‘Overton Window’ (the range of ideas that the public is willing to accept at a given time) for discussing issues in the
advertising industry around hate had moved significantly. “More and more advertisers are wanting to understand and dig really deep into these issues.” (Harriet Kingaby)

In particular, Alex Murray referenced the recent Online Advertising Programme’s Taxonomy of Industry Harms, a review commissioned by the Minister of State for Media, Data and Digital Infrastructure, based on a Consultation in 2020, and published in March 2022. The document names “placement of advertising next to illegal, inappropriate or harmful content such as hate speech or digital piracy” as an industry harm.

However, Harriet Kingaby, Alex Murray and Pia Oberoi highlighted that there were still practical challenges for advertisers ensuring that their content was not funding hate. Harriet Kingaby suggested “brands often want to act but don’t know how to.” In particular, the interviewees mentioned:
- The challenges posed by technological approaches to advertising, such as algorithmic programming, making oversight and control over content placement difficult.
- The potential ineffectiveness of AI technology.
- The ineffectiveness – and potential counter-productiveness – of keyword blocking.
- Sometimes limited understanding of hate and misinformation by marketing managers.

Interviewees also highlighted that some of the practical difficulties for advertisers in ensuring ethical advertising practices were particularly significant when it came to more subtle forms of hate. For example, Harriet Kingaby discussed the use of a ‘brand safety floor’, which caught the worst kinds of unethical advertising placement, for example next to the sale of arms, but which would not capture more subtle forms of hate; and use of AI technology which was also unlikely to capture more subtle forms. In this context, embedding human rights and legal standards into these complex technical approaches was highlighted as a difficult and important issue.

However, interviewees also suggested that some of these technological approaches made addressing the issue of advertising placement all the more important. Both Harriet Kingaby and Pia Oberoi emphasised that responsibility for ensuring appropriate advertising placement could not be devolved to algorithms, AI or other technologies used by the industry. “You have to speak with the communities, you have to contextualise. And then it’s a question of scale: can they all [the integration of human consultation] work where their advertising is going to end up nation-wide, or Europe-wide, or globally? How do they ensure [this is integrated]?” (Pia Oberoi)

In addressing these issues, Pia Oberoi suggested learning from the content moderation approaches around genocide or large-scale violence. “They’re not legally in the same basket, but the tools that you have could also probably be employed. The issue [though] is that we have more subtle and less subtle versions of that.”

6.2 Awareness around more subtle forms of hate

With regards to more subtle forms of hate, Harriet Kingaby suggested some level of confidence that the advertising industry would understand the issue: “by-and-large many will get it, because there’s been a lot of conversation about this.” However, interviewees suggested that some groundwork would need to be done to further engage advertisers in this area.

“The frame at the moment has been around individual articles and individual posts. That’s the conversation we have with the platforms and advertisers... We need to reframe this conversation to be less about individual posts and authors and more about national hate campaigns." (Harriet Kingaby)

She suggested that civil society interventions on more subtle forms of hate could help, by highlighting to advertisers that “these things aren’t happening in isolation. You have a role and responsibility to understand the long-term role of what you might be funding.’ Individual advertisers will then make those decisions [about when and whether to withdraw content].... If the public calls for recognition of more subtle forms of hate, people will listen.”

However, she also highlighted that engaging advertisers in some topics might pose more of a challenge than others.

“I think there are some that get it, and I think there have been particular trigger issues. The racism in football work that Alex led on got great support from advertisers for lots of reasons. You have a very human face to this... We empathise better with one person that lots of people. You’ve got compelling stories. You’ve got something where there’s lots of vested interest... Advertisers are primed to get involved in some of those discussions.... You had a single event that provoked an outcome none of us wanted.... There’s lots of things that made that a very compelling story, and I think advertisers got that intrinsically.

“I think if you’re talking about more marginalised people, people who don’t have a platform, you’re talking about impacts that advertisers might be like, ‘well, that doesn’t have anything to do with us’. Showing tangible impacts [for the advertiser, e.g. loss of revenue or custom] becomes harder.

She and Alex Murray highlighted particular tools that would be useful in engaging advertisers on a certain issue, including:

- Statistics from think tanks about the scale and nature of the issue
- Specific incidents to bring advertisers to the table
- Real life stories about a specific person and the impact it’s had on them

Rita Jabri Markwell believed that providing practical definitions for dehumanising discourse would de-mystify subtle hate and make it clear what is to be avoided. A news outlet materially contributes to dehumanization if, based on media from that news outlet, information is *serially and substantially curated to public audiences to portray a class of persons* as

Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
polluting, despoiling, or debilitating society;
- having a diminished capacity for human warmth and feeling or independent thought;
- acting in concert to cause mortal harm;
- being held responsible for and deserving of collective punishment for the specific crimes, or alleged crimes of some of their “members”; or
- to be easily subject to cruel or brutal treatment; and

The class of persons is identified based on a protected attribute (e.g., race, ethnicity, national or ethnic origin, religion, or asylum seeker status). She argued that dehumanization was a particularly harmful form of subtle hate that required specific targeting, because it removed moral barriers to violence. By championing these standards, mainstream news could also be taking a stance against information operations that weaponize their news for nefarious ends online.

7. What is the boundary of media responsibility when reporting on anti-migrant hate perpetuated by the government?

7.1 Perspectives on responsibility

Interviewees gave a range of perspectives on defining and communicating the boundary of media responsibility, in the context of anti-migrant government policies. In general, interviewees appeared to agree that the media should be responsible for ensuring non-hateful and balanced reporting. However, some expressed concerns about how feasible this position was in practice.

Pia Oberoi outlined the wider expectations for media ethics, and the way in which this demonstrated media accountability in the context of reporting on migration:

“Surely it just comes down to good media ethics. When you’re writing a story, if you’re doing it in good faith, if you’re writing a neutral story, are you giving as much space to the affected communities? Are you relying on their voice as much as you’re relying on policymakers’ voices?…

“Some of the training that we’re doing, or some of the messaging we’re putting in place, around how to ensure non-discrimination and equal representation in the media should apply to when they’re writing on migration. I find it quite alarming the extent to which when you’re writing about non-citizens, all of that training seems to go out of the picture…

“We don’t [think that we] have to accept the premises of impartiality or neutrality or the benefit of the doubt. If the papers are working [on a story about migration], we can put them in touch in a heartbeat with the communities that are advocating for undocumented migrants, or are undocumented migrant communities, or diaspora...
groups. It’s not that hard to engage with affected communities. It’s not new training they need on that. It’s not new education they need on that. They just need to know [that it’s] like if they were writing a story on disability: they would be sure to be in touch with disability rights activists to really try and understand the issue from the perspective of those who would be affected. It’s that simple.”

Pia Oberoi’s argument demonstrates the value of reiterating best practice in reporting. It also suggests the importance of parallels between reporting on migration and reporting on other legally protected areas that are recognised as subject to discrimination under the law (where migration status is not).

Faisal Hanif likewise argued that the media had a responsibility to question and interrogate government stances on migration (otherwise “that’s a failure of journalism. That isn’t journalism”), and suggested that this has been recognised by journalists themselves. For example, he referenced Peter Oborne’s condemnation of UK media for using government sources “without being interrogated in a proper journalist fashion.”

Others expressed more concern about the difficulties of holding the media accountable in a hostile policy context.

“The government is entirely responsible for the messages they put out into the world, and the media are responsible for the way in which they report those messages. Media is a corporate business first and foremost. For many media outlets there is no incentive for them to offer critical analysis and pull things apart because that style of journalism wouldn’t appeal to their readership.” (Amy Clarke)

“Some groups are seen as fair game [for hateful policy attacks]. It is seen as a vote winner. Some groups in particular have been badly served by the hate crime world: the Trans community, the Traveller, migrant and disabled communities… The UN’s Kyoto Resolution decided to adopt the UK approach to hate crime - but the UK is moving away from it…. I think it will be really difficult for Stop Funding Hate to make inroads while you have this government background. If they’re [the newspapers are] saying things no more extreme than what government ministers are saying, it’s really difficult to hold them to account… The media is sanctioned to repeat what politicians are saying.” (Mike Ainsworth)

7.2 Value of engaging with advertisers in a hostile policy context

Despite these concerns, some interviewees in fact suggested that a hostile policy context increased the importance of tackling media hate including through working with or targeting advertisers.

Bill Howe and Limor Simhony Philpott both referenced the cyclical, “symbiotic” relationship between media reporting and policy, implying the knock-on impact that challenging hateful media narratives could have on policy making.
Mike Ainsworth suggested that if advertisers or media were to redirect any criticisms of hateful reporting towards government sources or hateful government rhetoric, it would highlight issues in policy making. “Advertisers will point out that it’s just what the Home Secretary says… effectively calling politicians out.”

Harriet Kingaby and Alex Murray suggested that the value of engaging with advertisers was that it could circumvent any hateful government directives:

“There will be people who say, ‘the government says it, so it’s fine’… [But] there has been a [cultural] shift. It [advertising next to hateful content] is seen as a commercial risk. If we can keep bringing this argument back to what is the impact on real people and, on our side, what is the commercial risk of not doing this [i.e. addressing the issue], then we have a compelling argument. If polling says the UK public do not agree with the government on this and they won’t buy brands who support this, polling like that we can take to the CMO [Chief Marketing Officer] and say, ‘look, you’re going to lose advertisers if you continue to advertise here’.” (Harriet Kingaby)

“Publishers are free to print whatever they want, but it’s not their right to be funded for it. Advertisers should be making those decisions about where they want to be funding… Consumers have the right to decide where they want to be shopping…

“If you’ve got governments setting directives or anything like that, it’s kind of irrelevant when it comes to our work, because what we’re looking to do is empower brands to understand what kinds of harms they might be funding and what they can do about them. We’re actually in quite a privileged position where we don’t need to worry about what legislation is there because actually our Theory of Change, our model, is very much based around the decisions that advertisers can be making….

“A recent example is the move to challenge net zero: there’s evidence that there’s very little grounds to challenge it [net zero] but it’s massively in the newspapers. It’s being disproportionately pushed that there’s opposition to it [net zero]. But it doesn’t matter where that’s coming from. It doesn’t matter if that reflects a government line. It should be a question for an advertiser themselves, about where their morals and values sit.” (Alex Murray)
8. Are there other approaches that might help here too such as education or promoting discussion?

The interviewees discussed multiple other tactics for addressing more subtle forms of hate – from counternarrative work to engaging directly with those holding prejudicial views. It is beyond the remit of this research to explore these alternative tactics in depth. Therefore below, we list those mentioned that particularly relate to ensuring more conscious advertising and/or tackling subtle hate in the media directly:

- Educational work with advertisers: supporting them to understand the issues with subtle forms of hate and its cumulative impact;
- Encouraging the adoption of anti-dehumanisation standards
- Providing guidance on how to embed human rights concerns in technological approaches to advertising (such as algorithmic processing);
- Researching learnings from content moderation around genocide and large-scale violence to advertisers, in order to identify applicable tools and approaches for the advertising industry;
- Writing to All Party Parliamentary Groups about the issues;
- Publishing articles in the media about need to tackle more subtle forms of hate;
- Using techniques from the movement against climate misinformation, to try and ‘inoculate’ the public against misinformation against migrants:
  - Reframe the narrative: create a new narrative for example that ‘migration is great’. Target reframing to tackle hate against particular communities, for example if the South Indian community is being targeted, launch work to give them a voice.
  - Let people know in advance they lies they are likely to be told, by either discrediting the actors (for example, highlighting financial incentives for spreading disinformation such as investments) or anticipating the particular misinformation (for example, ‘a paper will tell you this, three times this week’)
  - Emphasise personal benefit: for example, ‘your child might benefit from the jobs created by migration’
- Encouraging advertisers to be part of the solution, for example, encouraging them to help reframe migration through their advertising campaigns (as they have done with regards to gender inequality);
- Encouraging advertisers to support best practice and smaller voices, such as some local community-based media.
Bibliography


Dangerous Speech Project, FAQs. Accessed 7th March 2022. dangerousspeech.org/faq/?faq=201


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration
Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration


La Rue, Frank, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration


McKinstry, Leo, Left-wing lawyers fighting Boris Johnson’s Rwanda migrant plan think they are so virtuous. But the truth is they have blood on their hands’ in Mail Online (5th May 2022). Accessed online 20th May 2022. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-10787423/LEO-MCKINSTRY-Left-wing-lawyers-fighting-Johnsons-Rwanda-migrant-plan-blood-hands.html


Olasov, Ian, ‘Offensive political dog whistles: you know them when you hear them. Or do you?’, (7th November 2016), Vice. www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/11/7/13549154/dog-whistles-campaign-racism


Poole, Elizabeth, and Milly Williamson. "Disrupting or reconfiguring racist narratives about Muslims? The representation of British Muslims during the Covid crisis." Journalism (2021): 14648849211030129.

Priti Patel destroyed with 3 simple facts about refugees, PoliticsJOE. Accessed via YouTube 8th March 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Af34YNsMe0


Robinson, James, ‘Afghan migrant who ‘drugged, raped and murdered 13-year-old girl’ then crossed the Channel WILL be extradited to Austria to stand trial as British court rejects his bid to remain in the UK’ in Mail Online, (12th January 2022). Accessed online, 20th May 2022. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10394347/Afghan-migrant-drugged-raped-murdered-13-year-old-girl-sent-Austria.html


Addressing subtle forms of hate in UK media coverage of migration